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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a case study for the historical archaeological examination 
of a battlefield. It presents an American Civil War battlefield, known as the Battle 
of Wilson’s Wharf, not so much as an archaeological site but rather as a cultural 
landscape of conflict. An examination of the artifactual residue of the battle 
patterned within the cultural landscape combined with an analysis of the historical 
documentation on the May 24, 1864, engagement, reveals a much broader insight 
into the nature of battlefields than can be reached through either history or 
archaeology alone. The thesis also makes recommendations for additional 
fieldwork on the battlefield.
ix
AN HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXAMINATION 
OF A BATTLEFIELD LANDSCAPE:
An Example from the American Civil War 
Battle of Wilson’s Wharf,
Charles City County, Virginia
INTRODUCTION
May 24th, 1864. Charles City County, Virginia. After an all night ride the 
2,500 Confederate cavalrymen under the command of Major General Fitzhugh Lee 
finally reached their destination. As the military activity near Richmond developed 
into a virtual stalemate, the Confederate government decided it was time to deal with 
a small situation transpiring downriver. On May 5 , Federal troops assigned to 
protect the communication and supply line of the Army of the James had landed at 
Wilson’s Wharf and established a base of operations. All throughout the month 
reports had come in stating the Union garrison was continuing to fortify their 
position. However, it was not the strategic location of the fortification that worried 
the Southern military as the Union navy controlled the James River. Rather it was the 
nature of the Federal infantry stationed at Wilson’s Wharf that caused Confederate 
officials such discomfort. For the Union soldiers consisted of two regiments of 
United States Colored Troops (U.S.C.T.) under the command of the contentious 
Brigadier General Edward Wild.
As in North Carolina, Wild continued to take the war to the local populace by 
raiding the surrounding countryside from his base at Wilson’s Wharf. Accounts of 
Wild’s activities, ranging from the factual to the fantastical, led outraged Southern 
citizens to demand action. By May 23, the Confederate army could no longer tolerate 
the idea of black soldiers operating freely in the heart of Virginia and General
2
3Braxton Bragg sent the cavalry force to “break up the nest and stop their uncivilized 
proceedings in the neighborhood” (Fitzhugh Lee’s Postwar Report 1866).
This thesis is based on an investigation of the May 24, 1864, Battle of 
Wilson’s Wharf conducted by the William and Mary Center for Archaeological 
Research in the fall of 2000 (Harwood 2001) (Figure 1 and 2). The project was 
funded by a grant from the National Park Service American Battlefield Protection 
Program (ABPP). The project sought to demonstrate the value of a systematic metal 
detector survey combined with in-depth historical research as a means of delineating 
troop positions within a battlefield site. The artifact distributions not only 
demonstrated a positive correlation with aspects of the historical record, but also 
provided valuable insights into areas where the written accounts were incomplete or 
silent.
By drawing on the data collected during the 2000 survey this thesis presents a 
case for the historical archaeological examination of a battlefield. It presents the 
Wilson’s Wharf battlefield not so much as an archaeological site but rather as a 
cultural landscape of conflict. An examination of the artifactual residue of the battle 
patterned within the cultural landscape, combined with an analysis of the historical 
documentation on the May 24, 1864, engagement, reveals a much broader insight into 
the nature of battlefields than can be reached through either history or archaeology 
alone. The thesis also makes recommendations for additional fieldwork on the 
battlefield.
4The following chapters provide an historical archaeological examination of 
the Wilson’s Wharf battlefield landscape. Chapter One examines issues related to the 
study of battlefield archaeology. Chapter Two presents the battlefield as a cultural 
landscape and examines the study of landscapes in historical archaeology. Chapter 
Three discusses the study of battlefield archaeology from its beginnings up to the 
present day. Chapter Four presents the history of the Battle of Wilson’s Wharf. 
Chapter Five provides a description of the cultural landscape encompassed by the 
battle and presents the data recovered from the 2000 fieldwork. Chapter Six provides 
an historical archaeological examination of the Battle of Wilson’s Wharf through a 
comparison of the historical record and the behavioral patterning of artifacts within 
the cultural landscape of the battlefield.
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Figure 1. Study Area location and environs (U.S. Geological Survey [USGS] 
1980, 1987).
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Figure 2. Aerial photograph of site environs (USGS aerial photo).
CHAPTER I.
ISSUES IN BATTLEFIELD ARCHAEOLOGY
In the mid-1960s, a growing number of American archaeologists began to 
specialize and focus on the study of the historic period. The establishment of the 
Society for Historical Archaeology in 1967 provided a professional forum for the 
presentation and exchange of ideas related to the study of historic sites. For nearly 
forty years, historical archaeology has attempted to strengthen its place within the 
field of anthropology through contributions to the understanding of the recent past 
(Shackel and Little 1994).
However, since its beginnings the field of historical archaeology appears to be 
continuously in a crisis of reinvention (see Harrington 1955; Binford and Binford 
1968; South 1977a; Ferguson 1977a; Schuyler 1978a; Deetz 1983; Leone and Potter 
1988; Little and Shackel 1989; Beaudry 1996). Much of the crisis has centered on 
questions of the definition of historical archaeology and its methods of contribution to 
the scholarly enterprise. DeCunzo (1996: 3) states that the debate has essentially 
turned on a few key issues: historical archaeology’s rightful place in history and the 
humanities or in anthropology and the sciences, our sources of evidence and 
approaches to analyzing and interpreting them, and the theoretical paradigms driving 
our investigations with their associated conceptions of culture and its relationship to 
material culture.
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The continual redefinition of the place of historical archaeology and its 
analytical contributions has led to the evolution of the field into an interdisciplinary 
endeavor that brings innovative approaches and perspectives to the study of the 
emergence of the modem world. Schuyler (1978b: 27) provides a concise 
characterization of historical archaeology as “the study of the material remains from 
any historic period.” South (1977a: xxix) adds that material remains of culture are 
examined in order to understand “past lifeways, culture history, and culture process.” 
Beaudry (1996: 476) notes that the historical archaeological process involves the 
combination of “sophisticated ethnographic analysis of documentary and oral 
historical data with.. .anthropologically sensitive excavation and material culture 
research to produce highly contextualized and nuanced studies of historical sites, 
neighborhoods, and communities.” Thus the unique approaches of historical 
archaeology appear to place the discipline “directly over the fault on the academic 
landscape that separates the social sciences from the humanities” in order to attend to 
both “the humanist’s concern for meaning, intention, and being, and to the scientist’s 
concern for form, behavior, and conditions. ” (Glassie 1977: 24).
The debate surrounding the definition of the field not only forced historical 
archaeologists to position themselves within both the sciences and humanities but to 
also address the problems and questions that drive the efforts of its practitioners 
(Mrozowski 1988). Historical archaeologists have realized that their unique position 
within the “academic landscape” affords them the opportunity to be omnivorous in 
their attempts to study the past. Through the use of a multievidential approach, 
researchers have integrated a wide range of documentary, ethnographic, scientific,
9and material culture evidence to forge a more productive understanding of the 
behavioral and cultural processes that shaped the modem world (Deegan 1988).
The expansion of the field of inquiry in historical archaeology has led to the 
examination of new bodies of evidence. One of the arenas that has benefited from the 
contribution of historical archaeology has been the study of battlefields. Battlefield 
archaeology is sometimes viewed as synonymous with military sites archaeology, a 
sub-discipline devoted to the study of features associated with military activities. 
Military sites archaeologists are concerned with the social and behavioral dynamics 
associated with the occupation and use of military features such as fortifications, 
earthworks, trenches, prisons, field hospitals, and camps. In a similar manner, 
battlefield archaeologists also investigate military facilities but rather with the view 
that the features are part of a larger cultural and natural landscape associated with a 
specific battle event.
As battle events occur within the cultural landscape over a relatively short 
time span compared to other occupational sites, the archaeological study of 
battlefields was initially ignored due to the misconception that no relevant 
information could be recovered from the residue of war. In recent decades, 
researchers have recognized the issues involved in the study of the battlefields and 
have begun to adapt traditional field methods and analytical techniques in order to 
accommodate the unique nature of the historical and archaeological record of 
battlefields.
For most of the twentieth century the excavation of battlefields was relegated 
to the domain of the relic hunter as historical archaeologists dismissed battlefields as
10
containing no meaningful stratigraphy and therefore no meaningful time dimension 
(Noel Hume 1969). Battlefield archaeology was viewed in much the same light as 
underwater archaeology, essentially a salvage rather than scientific project “requiring 
none of the archaeologist’s techniques of revealing, studying, and recording the 
relationships between objects and their stratigraphy” (Noel Hume 1969: 190).
It was reasoned that as archaeologists extract information from the 
relationship between objects and stratigraphy, the apparent lack of meaningful 
stratigraphy on a battlefield meant that no relevant information could be recovered 
from battle-related objects. Thus the perceived absence of vertical sequencing on 
battlefield sites relegated any battle-related objects to a mere scatter o f “relics.” Noel 
Hume failed to account for the information available from gross and dynamic pattern 
analysis when he noted, “there is little to be gained from the painstaking plotting of 
the position of each item” (1969: 190). It was not until the Little Bighorn study in 
the 1980s that historical archaeologists developed the potential of horizontal 
sequencing analysis within battlefields (Scott and Fox 1987).
The failure to develop analytical techniques for the analysis and 
documentation of battlefields was due in part to the bias of researchers. Given the 
robustness of the written record many asked: What can we learn from battlefield 
archaeology that we do not already know? Historical archaeologists were in a sense 
asking what battlefield archaeology could contribute to the discipline rather than what 
the discipline could contribute to the study of battlefields. In failing to address the 
issues involved in the analysis and documentation of artifactual residues of war,
11
historical archaeologists were overlooking major resources for understanding the 
physical manifestation of conflict.
One of the most challenging issues for battlefield archaeologists is the balance 
between the nature of the documentary and material culture evidence of an 
engagement. Smith (1994: 9) states that before archaeologists can offer germane 
contributions to the study of battlefields, they have a responsibility to assimilate the 
vast amount of documentary research. Battlefield archaeologists must become 
familiar with what is available in the primary source archives and the methods for 
using and interpreting documents (Schuyler 1988: 42). The task should not be 
viewed as a detriment or a limitation but rather as a means to enhance the relevance 
of archaeological work. Such historical context not only aids in the development of a 
context for the archaeological research, but also stimulates the discipline toward 
asking relevant questions. Smith (1994: 9) calls for battlefield archaeologists to be 
researchers who use and integrate the information provided by both documents and 
archaeology, rather than simply archaeologists excavating battlefields of the historic 
period.
Not only must battlefield archaeologists be experts in the traditional sources 
of documentary evidence, they must also be well versed in nontraditional literature. 
Espenshade et al. (2002: 43) notes that many archaeologists loathe the idea of 
purchasing relic-collector literature. While many “collector” books provide maps and 
descriptions of battlefields simply to aid in the looting of artifacts (LeGaye 1989) 
other sources provide educational overviews of specific arms, ammunition, and 
accoutrements (see Coates and Thomas 1990, Lords 1995, McAulay 1991, McAulay
12
1987, Melton and Pawl 1996, Tice 1997, Thomas 1997, Thomas and Thomas 1996). 
These sources represent years of research and can provide the battlefield 
archaeologist with the means to educate themselves in the technology and artifact 
types manufactured in the era of the engagement. Such nontraditional information 
can aid in the identification and interpretation of the material culture residue of a 
battle.
While it is important to investigate nontraditional sources of information, it 
must also be realized that sometimes the source of the information must also be 
considered. Many archaeologists have championed the use of relic hunters as 
archaeological informants (Espenshade et al. 2002: 42-43). They view 
communication with relic hunters as a potentially productive source of archival and 
field evidence and as a chance to transform looters into amateur archaeologists.
While some relic hunters can be made to see the error of their ways, a significant 
proportion will never understand the goals of archaeological research. Even if nine 
out of ten relic hunters repent their looting sins, it must be remembered that it only 
takes the one looter to rape a site of its integrity. Unfortunately, relic hunters, even 
reformed ones, tend to have friends who still enjoy “pot-hunting” and simple word of 
mouth, however innocent, can lead to the downfall of a battlefield site. Many 
archaeologists have returned to the site only to discover the artifacts and features they 
flagged had been looted over the weekend (Beis 2003). Just because archaeologists 
are supposed to operate under a system of ethics does not mean that a relic hunter will 
be bound by the same professional code.
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The abundance of the documentary record challenges historical archaeologists 
to develop and adapt traditional methods of archaeological inquiry to the unique 
nature of battlefields. Espenshade et al. (2002) provides a succinct overview of the 
challenges facing the study of battlefields. Battlefields have a low level of deposition 
scattered across the cultural landscape in comparison to domestic sites, which tend to 
have denser, more intensive concentrations of artifacts. Thus, at the survey level, 
many of the archaeological residues of battle events appear invisible when traditional 
methods, in the form of probabilistic sampling, are employed. The placement of 
shovel tests at regular intervals relies on a site containing a scatter of sufficient 
artifact density to allow detection. Even military facilities that underwent prolonged 
occupations in comparison to battle events, such as camps, have been missed entirely 
or misrepresented in their scope and value (Legg and Smith 1989: 132-33). At Folly 
Island, South Carolina, two different survey teams using the traditional survey 
methods of systematic shovel testing, failed to recognize the extensive nature of the 
Union campground (Smith 1994: 12). At Bray’s Island, South Carolina, another 
campground was missed altogether by shovel testing only to be discovered later by 
resurvey using a metal detector (Smith 1994: 12).
While many archaeologists have labeled the technology as merely a means of 
salvaging artifacts (Noel Hume: 188), researchers have proven the worth of the metal 
detector as an efficient and effective method for examining a battlefield (Scott and 
Fox 1987, Roach 2001). As most military artifacts that survive in the archaeological 
record are made of metals such as iron, copper, and lead, battlefield archaeologists 
quickly learned what had been known to relic hunters for decades - that the best way
14
to detect metal is with a metal detector. For the investigation of the 760 acres of the 
Little Bighorn project area, Scott et al (1989) determined that a systematic metal 
detector survey in conjunction with visual inspection and small block excavation 
would provide the most successful method for examining the battlefield area. Scott 
and other researchers (see Chapter 3) have shown how the combination of traditional 
and nontraditional archaeological methods is a requirement for the successful 
interpretation of the archaeological residue of war.
The challenges of developing an historical archaeology of battlefields may 
appear daunting, however through the mastery of the documentary data and the 
expansion of the traditional methods of investigation, researchers can contribute 
meaningfully to both the professional and public world of contemporary society 
(Smith 1994: 15). One of the necessary means to achieving a more widespread 
relevance is to advance the discussion of battlefields and military sites beyond the 
“grey literature” of compliance archaeology (Espenshade et al. 2002: 40). While the 
work of cultural resource management firms and non-profit agencies has contributed 
significantly to the study of battlefields, much of the resulting reports languish in a 
state of obscurity and are difficult to access. Historical archaeologists, regardless of 
affiliation, have begun to merge the requirements of report writing with an 
interpretive prose that makes the study of battlefields not only technically sound but 
also readable (see Fox 1993; Geier and Potter 2000; Geier and Winter 1994; Scott et 
al. 1989; Smith 1993).
Beyond adding to a public and professional understanding of battle events, 
archaeologists can make significant contributions to the study of cultural processes.
15
Archaeologists must begin by examining battlefields in order to establish basic, but 
very necessary, archaeological facts (Courbin 1988: 110-149). Smith (1994: 16) 
describes the method and importance of establishing archaeological facts.
Archaeological facts are established first through careful excavation and recording 
o f the site being excavated. Archaeological facts seem mundane but actually are 
critical discoveries, such as where an artifact is found or the identity o f a feature 
and its relationship to another (Courbin 1988: 112-113). Archaeological facts are 
those solid statements that are added to others to interpret a single site. The 
interpretations o f that site then are tested against interpretations o f other sites, and 
new archaeological facts are established.
It is through the comparison of facts that true patterns are seen, measured, and tested 
and from these patterns valid statements can be made concerning behavioral 
processes.
Smith (1994) determines that the establishment of archaeological facts 
achieves two critical steps: it provides historians and other disciplines with new 
information that can be absorbed into the general body of knowledge about warfare 
and it provides a scientific foundation upon which to build an archaeology of 
battlefields. Smith is quick to point out that the simple establishment o f facts is an 
aim that will be viewed as restrictive or particularistic, and thus fail to satisfy the 
larger theoretical concerns of the field. Yet it must be understood that a degree of 
particularism is central to all archaeological research given the unique events and 
individuals that shape the material record. To understand the relevance of battlefield 
archaeology, it is essential to have a historical and particular appreciation for the 
context of the battle (Potter 1994: 27).
The study of the context of the battle event is an important aspect of 
transitioning from the archaeological facts to the larger behavioral processes visible 
within the battlefield. The context of space is one of the most important, yet difficult
16
aspects o f a battlefield to interpret archaeologically due to the large scale of most 
battle events. An investigation of a battle event requires the battlefield to be 
examined within the context of the natural and cultural environment in which it was 
fought. The following chapter will present the battlefield as a cultural landscape and 
examine the study of landscapes in historical archaeology.
CHAPTER II.
BATTLEFIELD AS CULTURAL LANDSCAPE
In recent years the idea of landscape has become increasingly important in 
archaeology, not just from an academic point of view but also in relation to the 
protection and management of cultural resources (Ashmore and Knapp 1999; Brown 
and Samford 1994; Kelso 1996; Kelso and Most 1990; King 1994; Kryder-Reid 1994; 
Mayne and Murray 2001; Rossignol and Wandsnider 1992; Ucko and Layton 1999; 
Yamin and Metheny 1996; Young 2000; Zierden 1996). The idea of the “cultural 
landscape” is widely used and yet at the same time often poorly defined. As so often 
happens, an intractable term that defies close definition and lacks consensual 
understanding is among the most widely used. The following chapter will present a 
discussion of the definition of cultural landscape, current research in the historical 
archaeological study of landscape, and finally how the battlefield must be viewed as a 
cultural landscape.
Of the three dimensions of archaeology (form, time, and space), James Deetz 
(1990: 1-2) notes that the spatial dimension seems to have been approached 
somewhat discontinuously. While households and communities have received 
widespread attention, the space between has attracted far less consideration. This 
space contains the gardens, fields, rivers, roads, mountains, and other features that 
provide the “connective tissue” and give the households and communities their proper
17
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context (Deetz 1990: 1). The total context of all the natural and man-made features 
that exist both inside and outside human settlement is referred to as the cultural 
landscape (Orser 1996). The landscape is cultural in that it physically embodies the 
history, structure, and contexts of human behavior in such a way that they are not 
readily separable from each other (Hood 1996: 121).
The cultural landscape represents a generic term for the expression of 
particular ways of seeing the world, specialized in time and place. Traditionally, 
archaeologists have viewed the landscape as a physical phenomenon that is 
essentially of human construction. The landscape becomes an object to be measured 
or quantified or a subject to be reconstructed as it appeared at some defined stage in 
its past. Treating landscapes as objects for measurement or subjects for 
reconstruction aids in the development of archaeological approaches but fails to fully 
perceive the landscape as a socially constituted, spatially-referenced, and time 
dependent perspective of the world.
Landscapes are essentially social, not physical, constructions that are 
modified, categorized, defined, and negotiated according to a set of cultural plans 
(Deetz 1990: 2). Daniels and Cosgrove highlight the social construct of landscapes 
when they state, “a landscape is a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, 
structuring, or symbolizing surroundings” (1988: 1). The creation of the cultural 
landscape involves the application of value systems to the categorization and 
understanding of the spaces encountered by people as individuals, groups or whole 
communities. Cultural landscapes exist in a continuum of human perception and 
usage, and they can only be individually understood in the context of one another.
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In identifying the cultural landscape it would seem necessary to define the 
opposite or “natural landscape” representing land that has not been intentionally 
modified. However, the very concept of what is “natural” is in itself a subjective 
social construct and thus the natural environment (rivers, mountains, ravines, etc) 
becomes part of the cultural landscape. Hood (1996: 122) notes that natural 
landscapes are often perceived and categorized into culturally relevant entities such as 
“the wilderness”, “the edge of the Earth”, “the unknown”, “virgin land.” As soon as 
something is categorized as a natural landscape, it ceases to be so because it has now 
been brought into the realm of the social.
Landscape studies have become an increasingly important focus of attention 
in historical archaeology. Since the early 1980s archaeologists have realized that the 
cultural landscape is analogous to a document - a cultural autobiography empowered 
with the social context of human perception (Lewis 1993). The cultural landscape 
served as more than ornaments attached to the great houses of the past; it also 
expressed the ideals of those who affected and were affected by the environment. 
Studies of cultural landscapes in American historical archaeology have included 
analysis of region (Kealhofer 1999), urban towns and cities (Brown and Samford 
1994; Leone et al. 1989; Mayne and Murray 2001; Miller 1994, 1988; Shackel 1994; 
Wall 1994; Young 2000; Zierden 1996; Zierden and Herman 1996), houselots 
(Beaudry 1984; Harrington 1989, Rotman and Nassaney 1997), factories and 
boardinghouses (Beaudry 1989; Mrozowski and Beaudry 1990), gardens (Brown and 
Samford 1990; Kryder-Reid 1994; Leone 1984; Leone and Shackel 1990), ethnicity 
(Upton 1985), farmsteads (Adams 1990; Garrison 1996; King 1994), and
20
environment (Kelso 1996; Miller et al. 1990; Rovner 1990; Schoenwetter 1990). The 
following discussion will present an overview of three studies that incorporate a 
landscape approach in the examination of a recreated urban landscape, a symbolic 
garden landscape, and an urban farmstead.
Marley Brown and Patricia Samford (1994) examine the landscape of 
Williamsburg, Virginia, to challenge assumptions about eighteenth century urban life. 
Their research focuses on the aim of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation to 
recreate the cultural landscape of the colonial past. The early efforts of the 
foundation in the 1930s focused on unearthing and reconstructing eighteenth century 
buildings and gardens. As a result the picture of the past was a landscape skewed in 
favor of upper-middle-class and gentry homes, quaint shops, boxwood gardens, and 
grazing livestock (1994: 233).
Brown and Sanford identify the social connection between the restored 
landscape of the twentieth century and the reality of the eighteenth in that both are 
planned entities reflecting the cultural views of their creators (1994: 233). The early 
twentieth century vision of eighteenth century Williamsburg served to ease the minds 
of its Depression-era creators, but was in reality a sterile, inaccurate image of the 
past. Researchers have reexamined the eighteenth century landscape in light of new 
historical archaeological evidence.
Studies have shown that the prevalence for formal colonial gardens in the 
1930s was a greatly exaggerated view of the eighteenth century landscape. While 
formal ornamental gardens did exist, kitchen or utilitarian gardens were much more 
the norm. For example, Brown and Samford note that the excavations at the Shield’s
21
Tavern site revealed planting beds, walkways, and fencelines that were indicative of a 
large kitchen garden that would have provided food for the tavern’s kitchen (1994: 
234). Brown and Samford conclude that historical and archaeological research have 
played a prominent role in defining the scope, character, and level of landscape 
alteration within the town of Williamsburg from its beginnings to the present day.
In recent years historical archaeologists have been concerned with the role of 
gardens as social statements of status and power and to what extent the ornamental 
features enhanced or masked the solidarity among the various social sectors of the 
community (Yamin and Metheny 1996). Some of the most clear cut evidence that 
ordinary people understood the symbolism of ornamental landscapes comes from the 
seventeenth century South African estate of Vergelegen (Marked 1995).
Markell recounts the protest of Dutch settlers against the governor and how 
they sought his removal. As their resistance came to a successful end, the settlers 
exhibited their new power in a particularly forceful way. They trampled and 
destroyed both the mansion and its ornate garden as a means of removing the symbols 
of power from the landscape. The removal of the governor reveals that the rebels 
recognized the garden as a symbolic representation of power and status. Marked 
determines that the cultural landscape is a symbolically charged entity capable of 
yielding multiple and changing meanings.
Rotman and Nassaney (1997) build on the idea that members of society use 
space to reinforce and resist relations of power, authority, and inequality by 
organizing the cultural landscape to facilitate the activities and movements by some 
individuals, while constraining others. Through a political-economic approach,
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Rotman and Nassaney determine that, although the village of Plainwell, Michigan 
witnessed political, economic, and social changes at the local, regional, and national 
level, the nineteenth and twentieth century occupants of the Woodhams homelot 
experienced considerable continuity in class and gender relations.
During the course of the investigation, Rotman and Nassaney were forced to 
confront the meaning of rural and urban places as the case study shared 
characteristics of both but did not fit neatly into either category. Rural is typically 
characterized as agricultural, sparsely populated, and egalitarian while urban 
represents the opposite -  industrial, densely populated, and stratified (Rotman and 
Nassaney 1997: 43). As the nineteenth century properties o f the region embodied 
aspects of both categories, a simple dichotomy was lacking. Rotman and Nassaney 
developed the model of the “urban farmstead” to indicate that rural and urban are not 
mutually exclusive but rather constitute poles o f a continuum.
The developments in landscape archaeology have called into question the 
traditional methods of spatial analysis used in historical archaeology. The definition 
of landscape in the field of historical archaeology has typically involved the 
identification of the total terrestrial context in which archaeological study is pursued 
(Deetz 1990: 2). Albert Spaulding quipped that the definition of a site is “a place 
where an archaeologist digs” (In Deetz 1990: 1). However, to limit our view of the 
cultural landscape to only those gardens, houselots, and other features that can be 
perceived within the arbitrarily defined “site” is to lose sight of the all-pervasive 
quality of the cultural landscape. This sort of “tunnel vision” inhibits the perception
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needed to examine the archaeological record in the context of the larger cultural 
landscape.
Much of the same tunnel vision limited the traditional study of military 
landscapes. Military facilities, such as forts and camps, were treated singularly 
without any reference to the larger context of the cultural landscape. The focus on the 
history of an engagement or on the recovered material, while important in the creation 
of archaeological facts, accounted for only the time and form dimension of 
archaeology. The spatial dimension of the military landscape was overlooked as most 
military features were examined only within the arbitrary context of the “site”. While 
the site provides the archaeologist with a manageable study unit, many military 
archaeologists failed to look beyond the boundaries of the site to the larger context of 
the cultural landscape. Thus the extent of what was discussed on a military site 
tended to be only those artifacts and features that appeared within excavation areas.
Much of the early failure to account for the spatial dimensions of battlefields 
was due to the perception that a battlefield could be examined as a site. A battlefield 
is not a spatially discrete entity that can be precisely defined and measured. Most 
battlefields encompass large areas and typically lack the specific locational focus of 
the usual archaeological features (Deetz 1990: 2). Battle events ebb and flow over 
the cultural landscape as combatants interact with the natural and cultural features. 
Soldiers march to battle along roads, storm beaches, fight in towns, fields, jungles, 
and are often buried where they fall. To confine a battlefield within the boundaries of 
an archaeological site is to fail to account for the full spatial context of battle.
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Battlefields must be viewed as cultural landscapes as they physically embody 
the history and social structure of human behavior before, during, and after a battle 
event. Battlefields consist of military facilities and natural features that provide the 
“connective tissue” and give military actions a proper context. The battlefield 
becomes a unique snapshot of the cultural landscape during a moment o f human 
conflict. By examining the battlefield as a cultural landscape, historical 
archaeologists can bring to light the “cultural plans” and human processes involved in 
negotiation and manipulation of the environment during battle.
The combatants interact with the cultural landscape through socially defined 
rules and regulations known as strategy and tactics. Strategy is the “aspect of military 
science that deals with the planning and directing of projects and campaigns and 
involves the mass handling and movement of troops, artillery, and equipage for 
waging war within the theater of operations” (Haecker and Mauck 1997: 97).
Tactics, “the armored fist of strategy,” represent the means by which the field 
commander achieves the goals of the strategy planners (Haecker and Mauck 1997: 
97). Attack and defense, deployment of soldiers in advance or withdrawal, patrols 
and skirmishes, commitment of additional troops are all elements o f tactics.
Military tactics function as a set of culturally defined plans that direct soldiers 
within the landscape and therefore any understanding of battlefield archaeology must 
recognize the relationship between tactics and the battlefield landscape. War tactics 
represent prescribed patterned behavior governing the movement, deployment, and 
establishment of troops (Fox and Scott 1991). Thus as war tactics are patterned, so 
too will the residues of tactics in warfare -  artifacts, features, and their contextual
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relationship - also be patterned. An examination of battle remains in the context of 
the battlefield landscape can reveal patterning indicative of the cultural plans that 
guided and directed the conflict.
A general overview of battlefield research traces the transition o f the field 
from the singular focus on the historical or material culture remains of a battle to the 
development of a multidisciplinary approach that meshes history, ethnographic, 
archaeology, and geography to examine battle events within the proper context of the 
battlefield landscape.
CHAPTER III.
RESEARCH IN BATTLEFIELD ARCHAEOLOGY
“Little can be usefully said about battlefield sites.. .and the salvage of relics 
becomes the be all and end all ” (Noel Hume 1968:188). Every researcher 
specializing in the study of battlefields is familiar with the disparaging remarks 
presented by Noel Hume in his antiquated guide to historical archaeology. Such 
pessimism may have been warranted throughout much of the twentieth-century as 
traditional battlefield interpretations often focused more on a history of the 
engagement. If an archaeological investigation was conducted it focused on a 
description of recovered artifacts or excavated features rather than the placement of 
the soldiers within the military or battlefield landscape (see Calver and Bolton 1950; 
Harrington 1978; James and Stotz 1958; Manucy 1962; Maxwell and Binford 1959; 
Peterson 1964).
Early archaeologists tended to overlook battlefields as battle events occur 
within a short span of time relative to most occupational sites. While a domestic 
occupation may span hundreds of years, a battle event may only occur over a few 
hours. A battlefield was thought to have no meaningful stratigraphy and 
consequently no meaningful time dimension. Traditional interpretations have 
therefore provided a perception of battlefields as a largely static and random 
configuration of artifacts and features situated within the cultural landscape.
By the end of the twentieth century archaeologists began to view battlefields 
in a new light. Ferguson (1975, 1977b), South (1977a) and Gould (1983) were
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among the first in historical archaeology to define behavioral patterns of warfare in 
cultural terms. Ferguson’s spatial study of the lead ball types recovered from Fort 
Watson demonstrated how historical documents, the archaeological record, and the 
behavioral principles that create the archaeological record can be used to interpret 
battle events. South expanded on the Fort Watson data and suggested that the 
recognition of patterning within a battlefield can lead to a greater understanding of 
the cultural processes of conflict. Gould extended the archaeological study of war 
and the search for behavioral patterning into the realm of underwater archaeology.
Ferguson was one of the first researchers to conduct an historical 
archaeological examination of a military site with the purpose of reconstructing battle 
events through a spatial analysis of battle-related artifacts. During the summers of 
1972 and 1973, Ferguson conducted excavations at Fort Watson, a Revolutionary 
War fortification in South Carolina occupied by the British for four months from 
1780-1781. American forces attacked and captured Fort Watson by firing from a 
high tower overlooking the fort. A comparison of the spatial distribution of various 
types of fired and unfired lead balls allowed Ferguson to determine the direction of 
the American assault on the fort.
South (1977) discusses the patterning of battle-related artifacts recovered by 
Leland Ferguson at Fort Watson. While the Fort Watson data did not fall within the 
Carolina or Frontier Pattern, South did attempt to identify artifact patterning that 
would be indicative of the battle. South determined that a battle event could be 
recognized through “a classification of musket balls, rifle balls, and shot on the basis 
of whether or not they have been distorted through having been fired” (South
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1977:159). Military sites that were the scene of a battle should display a higher ratio 
of distorted to nondistorted ammunition. While South did not develop his idea for a 
Revolutionary War Military Outpost Pattern/Battle Pattern, he helped lay the 
groundwork for future research on the study of battle-related artifacts.
Gould built on the work of South and searched for behavioral patterning 
within the underwater archaeology of war. Gould examined two case studies in the 
history of war, the Spanish Armada of 1588 and the Battle of Britain of 1940, to draw 
attention to general relationships that may exist between particular kinds of 
combatant behavior and the archaeological residues that the behavior can be expected 
to produce. Gould makes the analogy that archaeological signatures can identify 
particular kinds of behavior in much the same way that sonar signatures can identify a 
particular submarine.
Gould (1983:134) states that the value of the study of war in the 
archaeological context is its capability to “identify specific relationships between 
certain kinds of behavior under the stress of war and the characteristic material by­
product of the behavior of their final (archaeological) context o f discard.” While 
Gould acknowledges that law-like relational statements can be perceived as aspatial 
and atemporal, he determines the goal is not the law itself but the acquisition of new 
knowledge as one is directed by the questions raised through such law like 
formulations (Gould 1983).
Following the work of Ferguson at Fort Watson, few studies attempted to 
identify the relationship between behavioral patterns and the movement of troops on 
the battlefield landscape. Rather, most investigations focused on the documentation
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of the social dynamics of military life at camps, forts, hospitals, outposts, and prisons 
(Balicki 2000; Cross and Wallsmith 1992; DeVore 1990; Farris 1983; Faulkner 1986; 
Fisher 1987; Huey 1991; Legg and Smith 1989; Losey 1971; McBride et al. 2000; 
Monks 1992; Prentice and Prentice 2000; Reitz and Honerkamp 1983; Siedal 1990, 
Smith 1993; Starbuck 1990; Staski and Johnston 1992; Whitehome et al. 2000; 
Williams 1992).
The study of battlefields was revolutionized in the 1980’s with the 
groundbreaking investigation of the June 25-27, 1876 Battle of the Little Bighorn 
presented by Douglas Scott and Richard Fox (Scott and Fox 1987; Scott et al. 1989; 
Fox 1993). As most artifacts of war are metal or associated with metal, a controlled 
metal detector survey was used to investigate the large battlefield area. While the 
Little Bighorn study may not have been the first investigation to employ a metal 
detector on an archaeological site (see Gregory and Rogerson 1984), the study was 
pioneering in the scientific and systematic application of the technology to a 
battlefield landscape. Fox and Scott employed the comparative methods of artifact 
analysis developed by Ferguson in his investigation of Fort Watson. The mapping of 
battle-related artifacts within a grid system set over the site revealed both Native 
American and United States cavalry positions based on artifact type, class, and 
density variation.
Through a comparison of historical documentation and archaeological data, 
Fox and Scott (1991) developed a framework within which battlefield behavioral 
dynamics could be examined. The Battlefield Pattern analysis provided the key by
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which behavioral events at the Little Bighorn battlefield represented in space could be 
ordered in time as well.
The Battlefield Pattern
The Battlefield Pattern developed by Fox and Scott is an attempt to inquire 
about battle events not only in space but in time as well. An examination of 
behavioral interactions within the battlefield landscape, on the individual and unit 
level, allows Fox and Scott to go beyond the traditional archaeological interpretation 
of a battle as a static event. The Battlefield Pattern incorporates history and 
archaeology whereby historical research affixes identity to the actors and events 
while the archaeological record sets the actors and events in motion. The key to the 
resolution of the Battlefield Pattern is the examination of behavioral patterns at two 
inclusive analytical levels: gross pattern and dynamic pattern analysis.
Fox and Scott determined the analytical foundation for the Battlefield Pattern 
is laid by recognizing individual behavioral patterns. Behavioral patterns are 
expressed through individual behaviors directed and constrained by the norms, 
values, sanctions, and statuses governing the group within which the individual 
operates (Fox and Scott 1991). The military represents one of the most rigidly 
defined and hierarchically ordered groups and thus, in warfare, tactical operations are 
designed to precipitate individual behaviors carried out within and on behalf of the 
military unit. As war tactics represent prescribed patterned behavior governing the 
movement, deployment, and establishment of troops, so too will the residues of 
warfare -  the artifacts, features, and their contextual relationships -  also be patterned 
and reflect details of battlefield behavior (Fox and Scott 1991).
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Fox and Scott (1991) note that the recognition of individual behavioral 
patterns is dependent upon the identification of individual positions and movements 
on the battlefield. As individual behavior is the product of unit operations, individual 
patterns, though themselves discrete, should generally reflect unit behavioral patterns 
in time and space. By integrating individual patterns of the soldier, unit patterns of 
the squad, platoon, company, battalion, etc., emerge. It is the composite of unit 
patterns representing opposing forces that define the Battlefield Pattern that accounts 
for the events and progress of a battle (Fox and Scott 1991).
The Battlefield Pattern characterized by Scott and Fox (1991) requires an 
investigation of the archaeological data at two inclusive analytical levels: gross 
pattern and dynamic pattern analysis. Fox and Scott define gross patterning as “a 
synchronic approach that represents a composite of battle events exclusive of, or 
poorly understood in time.” (1991: 93). Battle events are perceived statically at fixed 
locations on the battlefield landscape using archaeological density information, such 
as artifact clustering, clinal distributions, or presence/absence criteria. Behavioral 
patterning is then interpreted from frequencies, variations, and proportions within and 
between artifact classes.
Fox and Scott identify the danger of relying solely on the archaeological 
record to assign meaningful identities to the gross patterns observed on the battlefield.
Historical sources provide the means by which gross patterning can be differentiated.
Certain combatant positions may be ascribed to one combatant group; others, to the 
opposing force by using historical accounts. Accounts such as eyewitness testimonies, 
maps, and official reports may also allow identification o f archaeological data as residues 
o f known units, such as regiments or companies, comprising an army. A detailed knowledge 
o f organizational, tactical, ordnance, and equipage variation is necessary, particularly 
where opposing forces differ only subtly.
Fox and Scott 1991: 94
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Gross pattern development is dependent upon the fit between history and archaeology 
or the resolution of discrepancies between the two. However, even with the aid of the 
historical record, it is usually difficult to distinguish individual positions in unit 
patterns without the aid of dynamic pattern analysis (Fox and Scott 1991). Dynamic 
pattern analyses help resolve the fit and, by adding the temporal element to gross 
patterns, provide a mechanism for testing historical theories regarding the progress of 
the battle.
Fox and Scott determine the key to translating gross patterns into dynamic 
patterns is based on modem firearm identification analysis of ammunition 
components.
Firearm identification analysis allows resolution o f individual positions and movements, 
or trajectories, across a battlefield. Individual patterns are integrated to form unit patterns; 
together these patterns develop the flow or progress o f a battle, allowing hypothesis testing 
and formulation o f alternative explanations.
Fox and Scott 1991: 94
The procedures undertaken for the Little Bighorn study followed ballistics analysis 
methods typically used in police laboratories. When a firearm is discharged and 
reloaded, distinguishing attributes are imparted to the ammunition components. A 
comparative analysis of the firing pin, extractor, and land-and-groove marks or 
“signatures” on the cartridge case and its projectile, the bullet, can provide 
information that is vital to the resolution of dynamic patterning. Fox and Scott (1991: 
95) note that the comparative analysis o f signature variations allows sorting of 
ammunition components representative of individual weapons. When all unique 
signatures are compared and sorted, the number of individual weapons within each 
type can be determined.
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Precise artifact locational data (gross patterning) coupled with individual 
firearm signature comparisons (dynamic patterning) can be used to trace the positions 
and movements of combatants across a battlefield. A cluster of casings or bullets can 
indicate a single firing position. Ammunition components with identical signatures 
from several discrete locations indicate that the weapon moved about the battlefield. 
The identification of a spatially discrete set of identical signatures dissimilar in 
composition to other sets elsewhere in space reflects a group of individuals who 
composed a discrete military unit. The spatial and temporal patterning of units 
provides insight into the horizontal sequencing of battle events that occurred across 
the battlefield landscape. The archaeological sequencing o f a battle can then be 
compared with the documentary record to give historical context to those who fought 
and died.
Scott and Fox applied the Battlefield Pattern analysis to the investigation of 
the Little Bighorn battlefield (Scott and Fox 1987; Scott et al. 1989; Scott 1991; Fox 
1993). The Custer Battlefield Pattern illustrated the transformation of gross 
patterning into time and space dynamics. Gross archaeological patterning identified 
the positions of U.S. troopers and Native American warriors within the battlefield 
landscape. Firearm type analysis provided a spatial-temporal relationship between 
combatant units that allowed Fox and Scott to develop a historical-archaeological 
examination of the behavioral patterns that contributed to the demise of Custer and 
his men.
Beginning in the 1990s a growing number of archaeologists began to employ 
the battlefield pattern developed by Fox and Scott on a wide variety of American
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battlefields such as those associated with the Mexican-American War (Haecker and 
Mauck 1997), Civil War (Comelison 2000; Lees 1994; Potter et al. 2000; Scott and 
Hunt 1998; Sterling and Slaughter 2000; Whitehome and Geier 2000), and Indian 
Wars (Adams et al. 2000a, 2000b; Ludwig and Stute 1993; Pratt 1995). The key to 
the success of these studies is the search for behavioral patterning within the context 
of the battlefield landscape. The following will present a discussion of three 
battlefield studies that employed a systematic metal detector survey and the 
contribution each has made to the archaeology of battlefield landscapes.
Haecker and Mauck (1997) present an analysis of the 1846 battle of Palo Alto, 
Texas, the first major engagement of the War with Mexico and one of only a handful 
to be fought in what is now the United States. In the late 1990s, the Palo Alto 
battlefield became the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site, a unit of the 
National Park Service (NPS). As part of the NPS planning efforts, limited 
archaeological investigations were undertaken at the site in an effort to delineate the 
Mexican and American battlelines, as well as other features and archaeological sites. 
Haecker, an NPS archaeologist, headed the archaeological investigations of Palo Alto 
and produced a fine technical report (Haecker 1994).
The battle was essentially an artillery duel, pitting new and well-developed 
United States cannon and mobile artillery tactics against antiquated Mexican artillery. 
The guns of the American army pounded the Mexican line for nearly eight hours 
while the Mexican artillery proved ineffective. The Mexican army stood fast, 
absorbed the shelling, and even attempted flanking and frontal assaults on the
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American lines. However the Mexicans were repulsed with heavy losses and retired 
from the field late in the day.
Haecker and Mauck provide a masterful story of the Palo Alto battle using 
both the historical and archaeological context. The historic context of the battle is 
developed through an examination of the comparative strengths, tactics, recruitment 
policies, arms, and equipment of the two armies. Building on the historical analysis, 
Haecker and Mauck develop a detailed analysis of the battle through the use of 
landscape studies, which they term topographic analysis. The landscape study is then 
compared with contemporary battle reports and maps of troop deployment to 
correlate Napoleonic-era weaponry and tactics with topographic features of the 
battlefield.
One outcome of the Palo Alto battle study was the identification of a pattern 
of use of smoothbore weaponry in the pre-Civil War era. Haecker and Mauck were 
able to correlate the linear-and-column tactics typical of this type of warfare with 
linear depositions of artifacts on the battlefield landscape. They were also able to 
demonstrate that the Mexican army was armed with a variety of out-dated, poorly 
maintained, Napoleonic War-era surplus British firearms.
Haecker and Mauck also identified some of the difficulties inherent in 
battlefield landscape studies. They realized that while linear depositions were 
apparent on the Palo Alto battlefield, the same distributions might not always appear 
on Euro-American battlefields dating to the same time period. Haecker and Mauck 
state, “Each battle has its own unique set of parameters.. .Terrain, vegetative cover or 
lack thereof, weather, chosen tactics, competency of the commanders, morale of the
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soldiers, the degree of relic hunting -  these and many other factors ultimately decide 
what type(s) of artifact patterning one will find” (1997: 183). Thus the particular 
nature of each battlefield must be considered when attempting to develop broad 
patterns of warfare.
One of the unique elements of the Palo Alto study was uncovered during the 
examination of the armament system employed during the time of the battle. While 
cartridge signature analysis is an appropriate and highly productive avenue of 
research when investigating battles of the Civil War era and later, those who fought at 
Palo Alto possessed a fundamentally different armament system. Both American and 
Mexican armies were supplied primarily with smoothbore weaponry with rifles 
playing a relatively minor role during the battle. Firearm ammunition came in the 
form of round lead balls and black powder usually wrapped together into a cartridge 
made of paper. Metal cartridges did not make their debut on battlefields until the 
1860s. The absence of cartridge signatures required Haecker and Mauck to examine 
the battle residue in light of the particular nature of the technology and tactics 
available to the Mexican and American armies.
Through a comparison and assessment of the arms, equipage, and logistics of 
the two armies it was possible to translate the artifact patterning within the Palo Alto 
landscape into behavioral dynamics of the smoothbore period. The strength of the 
Palo Alto study is that Haecker and Mauck employ an interdisciplinary approach to 
the study of battlefield landscapes and transform a “grey literature” report into a well- 
developed and highly readable scholarly endeavor.
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Lees (1994) discusses the investigation of the Civil War battle o f Mine Creek, 
Kansas. Research focused on a program of discovering and recording battle-related 
or potentially battle-related artifacts in order to examine the national, regional, local, 
individual, and personal contexts of the historic event. For poorly documented 
battlefields such as Mine Creek, historical archaeology offers the potential to anchor 
details of the historical events to a modem landscape.
On October 25, 1864, the provisional Army of the Border attacked and routed 
the Confederates at Trading Post, Kansas. Seven miles down the road and several 
hours later, Federal cavalry forces engaged the rear guard of Confederate cavalry at 
Mine Creek. A short but sharp clash resulted in a decisive Federal victory known as 
the Battle of Mine Creek. The battle engaged roughly seven to eight thousand 
Confederate cavalry and two to three thousand Union cavalry. Although the 
Confederates had an impressive numerical superiority, they suffered substantial 
casualties and quickly gave way to the better-armed Federal cavalry. The fight lasted 
less than half an hour but resulted in the death of a least three hundred and capture of 
five hundred Confederate troopers.
In the historical context, the battle of Mine Creek was something of an 
anticlimax to the real civil war that Kansas had known in the 1850s and that still 
found expression during the early 1860s. In a different sense, the battle interrupted 
the political and economic construction of a new state, as many Kansans remained 
more concerned with the hostilities of the Plains Indians than with the Confederacy.
An archaeological examination of the recovered ammunition identified 
positions associated with the Confederate and Federal cavalry. Lees determined that
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Confederate cavalry was armed with the more outdated muzzleloading carbines while 
the Federal cavalry were armed with the more advanced breechloading carbines. As 
bullets for breechloaders were the most common type identified on the battlefield, it 
followed that the outnumbered Federals were still able to fire more rounds per capita 
than their Confederate counterparts armed with muzzleloaders.
From the historical and archaeological evidence, Lees examined the battlefield 
landscape of Mine Creek. A feature of the battlefield that emerged very clearly from 
the study was the location of the route of Confederate withdrawal south of Mine 
Creek. The route followed an abandoned road that appeared as a shallow swale 
leading from a rock-bottom ford. Another ford had been historically interpreted as 
the main ford used during the battle, however Lees was able to identify the correct 
route of retreat.
Lees acknowledges that his conclusions may seem particularistic and not 
applicable to the broader contexts of the battle. However, it is at the humanistic level 
that archaeology comments on the importance of the Mine Creek battle and the Civil 
War. While the positions of combatants were identified through artifactual evidence, 
Lees reminds the reader that the dropped bullet is a stark reminder that a soldier stood 
nearby. In a different way, the recovery of fired bullets testify to the very individual 
level of conflict as the projectiles were intended to take an individual’s life. Lee sums 
up his humanistic view of the battlefield landscape:
For the individuals involved in this battle, the universe shrank, for a moment, to the 
fields on either side o f Mine Creek. The social and political dynamics that form a 
context for the battle were no longer a part o f the context for the participants. The 
context became the landscape, the thousands o f other individuals who shared the 
field, and the act o f survival. The artifacts and the patterns o f battle comment on 
this.
Lees 1994:58
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Adams et al. (2000a) presents a study of the Last Chance Canyon 
Apache/Cavalry battlefield. Beginning in the summer of 1997, the Lincoln National 
Forest Heritage Program began an intensive Apache Indian War Period Research 
Project in the Guadalupe Mountains of southeastern New Mexico. With limited 
historical information, archaeologists set out to locate and identify the November 18,
1869 battle between the Apaches and members of the Third United States Cavalry. 
The battle is important as it represents one of the first documented Cavalry incursions 
into the Guadalupe Mountains.
A landscape approach was used during the project to compare and contrast 
the archaeological and historical record. Historical accounts provided descriptions 
and measurable distances on the landscape in order to identify the location of the 
Apache rancheria and the skirmish lines. Cavalry participants recounted the battle 
with reference to physical features such as the “canyon”, “stream”, and “small steep 
hill with a commanding view.” Adams et al. corroborated the historical descriptions 
with the cultural landscape to locate the battle area.
From the battle residue, Adams et al. determined that the Apaches were 
caught off guard, something that was usually not accomplished by the Cavalry. The 
strategy employed by the Cavalry was successful as it sought to attack the Apache in 
their stronghold during the winter months, a tactic that was not expected. The study 
showed that the Apache warriors responded with the implementation of a strategy of 
delay while the women and children escaped.
One aspect of the project was to define and document the existence of the 
Apache rancheria described in the documentary record. The first two summers failed
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to locate the Apache camp due to misconceptions regarding the cultural landscape of 
the Apache. The early surveys examined only the flat open areas on the edge of 
drainages. In the summer of 1999, a reevaluation of strategy led to the investigation 
of less obvious areas near the base of slopes, recessed benches, hillsides, hilltops, and 
in areas of thick vegetation. The rancheria was discemable by the intentionally 
constructed rock rings situated on recessed benches at the base of the canyon. To the 
Apaches, the immediate proximity of water was not important, though it was 
available within a short distance. The most important aspect in the Apache landscape 
was the placement of the rancheria site near multiple avenues of escape up side 
drainages and over hills. By abandoning their own preconceived notions o f the 
Apache cultural landscape, Adams et al. were able to identify and document the battle 
event and develop a better understanding of Apache culture.
The following chapters present a case study for the historical archaeological 
examination of a battlefield. The American Civil War battlefield, known as the 
Battle of Wilson’s Wharf, is presented not so much as an archaeological site but 
rather as a cultural landscape of conflict. An historical examination of the May 24,
1864 engagement, combined with an analysis of the artifactual residue of the battle 
patterned within the cultural landscape, reveals a much broader insight into the 
nature of battlefields than can be reached through either history or archaeology 
alone.
CHAPTER IV.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE BATTLE OF WILSON’S WHARF
The pre-Civil War historical information was summarized from a more 
intensive study conducted by Charles M. Downing (1996). The Civil War historical 
information was drawn from official war records and correspondence, newspaper 
accounts, historic maps, and secondary sources relating to the 1864 campaign of the 
Army of James, the May 24 Battle of Wilson’s Wharf, and the subsequent occupation 
of Fort Pocahontas.
1635-1861
The property encompassing the battle of Wilson’s Warf was first purchased in 
July 1635 by David Jones and was described as a 300 acre tract “a little below the 
point, butting South Southwest upon the maine river, being bounded between 2 
Creeks, the second & third Creeks below Matticoe Creek” (Nugent 1992:1: 25). The 
property became known as Kennon’s Landing when Richard and Ann Hunt Kennon 
purchased the tract in the late 1730s. In 1738, at the age of 26, Richard Kennon was 
elected to the House of Burgesses, where he served for seventeen years. In 1742, the 
Virginia Assembly chose Kennon’s Landing as the site of one of two tobacco 
inspection warehouses in Charles City County (Hening 1969:V: 144).
In early January 1781, British troops commanded by Benedict Arnold began 
moving up the James River. The British colonel John Simcoe led about 100 of the
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Queen’s Rangers in an assault on the American stronghold of Fort Powhatan at Point 
Hood. Simcoe’s men met no resistance as the Americans had withdrawn at their 
approach. Arnold and about 1000 troops then ascended to Kennon’s Landing and 
disembarked at Westover Plantation. Troops under his command pillaged and 
vandalized the properties at Westover and Berkeley Plantation.
The wharf and warehouse at Kennon’s survived the war as indicated when the 
Assembly again designated the property as the site of a tobacco inspection warehouse 
(Hening 1969:XI: 210). The property later changed hands several times until it was 
sold to Josiah C. Wilson in November 1835. Kennon’s Landing, or Wilson’s Wharf 
as it would become known, appeared to be the only officially designated stop on the 
steamboat line in the immediate area. Edmund Ruffin mentioned the wharf in his 
1857 description of a visit to the home of former president John Tyler. Ruffin 
traveled to “Kennon’s W harf’ (as he called it) and walked “three and a half miles to 
Sherwood Forest, ” carrying his “very light carpet bag” (William and Mary Quarterly 
Historical Magazine 1906:194; Nasca et al, 1998:12).
The Civil War -1 8 6 2
The Union Peninsula campaign of 1862 was the largest single campaign of the 
Civil War. Nearly a quarter of a million men were assembled on the Virginia 
Peninsula as the principle army of the Federal government fought the principle army 
of the Confederacy for control of Richmond (Spears 1992). From late March to late 
June 1862 McClellan’s operations at Yorktown and Seven Pines pushed the 
Confederates west toward the Southern capital. With the wounding of General 
Joseph Johnson at Seven Pines, Robert E. Lee was given command of the Army of
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Northern Virginia. Lee quickly took to the offensive and in the Seven Days’ Battle 
drove the Federal army back down the Peninsula. When the campaign was finally 
over, one of every four men engaged was dead, wounded or missing.
From the abundance of the late 1862 inventory, it appears the Wilson property 
was left relatively unscathed after McClellan’s 1862 Peninsula Campaign (Charles 
City County Will Book 6:161). Other plantations in the area were not so lucky as 
Union troops destroyed property and killed livestock. For the Wilson family, the year 
1864 would bring the worst of the war directly to their doorstep.
The Civil War -1864-5
By its third autumn the Union war effort was facing a major reorientation. 
Fresh from a series of victories in the Western Theater, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. 
Grant succeeded Major General Henry W. Halleck as general-in-chief of the armies 
of the United States. Grant became responsible for coordinating the Federal activities 
in all theaters in order to bring the war to a successful conclusion for the Union. To 
accomplish victory, Grant was now required to formulate a plan of attack for the 
Federal forces in the Eastern Theater, as well as for his more familiar armies in the 
West. Grant initially rejected the customary overland advance toward Richmond in 
favor of an entirely different course of action (Robertson 1987). He proposed a thrust 
from Suffolk, in southeastern Virginia, to Raleigh, North Carolina, by a force of 
approximately sixty thousand men. Throughout the advance, the invading army 
would destroy important railroad facilities along the way, and coupled with the threat 
posed by the arrival of the army at Raleigh, would force the Confederates to evacuate 
Richmond and most of Virginia.
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However, after conferring with Lincoln, Grant set aside his North Carolina 
plan in favor of a more conventional line of advance. In the spring campaign of 1864 
there would be two major Federal offensives (Robertson 1987). The first would 
consist of a drive by Major General William T. Sherman’s armies from Chattanooga, 
Tennessee, toward Atlanta, Georgia. The second advance would consist of an 
overland push by Major General George Meade’s Army of the Potomac toward the 
Confederate capital of Richmond.
Supplementing the two primary offensives were to be three smaller 
operations: an advance by an army under Major General Nathaniel Banks from New 
Orleans to Mobile, Alabama, an advance by Major General Franz Sigel into the 
Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, and an advance by Major General Benjamin Butler’s 
Department of Virginia and North Carolina (later referred to as the Army of the 
James) from Hampton Roads up the south side of the James River toward Richmond. 
Grant considered the James River column a high priority as Butler’s army was to 
serve as the left wing of the grand Federal offensive in which the Army of the 
Potomac represented the center and Sherman’s forces the right wing (Robertson 
1987).
Benjamin Butler and the Army o f  the James
In October 1863, after a long deliberation President Lincoln took a chance and 
renamed Benjamin Butler as commander of the organization know as the Department 
of Virginia and North Carolina (Figure 3). A prominent criminal lawyer and 
Democratic politician in Massachusetts before the war, Butler initially commanded 
the Department at Fort Monroe in August 1861 but was installed as the commander of
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the subject of rumors and illicit affairs, Butler was finally relived of his post in the 
Department of the Gulf after an altercation with the City’s foreign consuls. Butler 
remained without a command until his return to the Hampton Roads area in 1863.
Figure 3. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler (Library of Congress)
Benjamin Butler was not the logical choice for most military men who 
considered it folly to entrust a citizen-soldier with field command. However, Lincoln 
may have reasoned that Butler’s new appointment was not significant enough to 
ensure the General a triumph of epic proportions, nor would his army campaign in the 
mainstream of the Virginia theater. Meade’s army would continue to be the focus of 
Northern attention by virtue of its size, its long term opposition to Lee, and its role as 
defender of Washington D.C. (Longacre 1997).
Undaunted, Butler realized the important role his army would play in the 
spring campaign of 1864 given his department’s position astride the southern 
approach to Richmond (Figure 4). The quick minded general had been studying the
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advantages offered by an advance up the James River basin since his installation as 
commander. Butler recognized that the Richmond defensive fortifications were less 
formidable to the south and that the surrounding high ground would be suitable for 
maneuvering. In addition, the Bermuda Hundred peninsula would serve as an 
excellent base for operations. Located approximately 15 miles south of Richmond at 
the confluence of the Appomattox and James Rivers, the Bermuda Hundred peninsula 
was characterized by deep ravines at its foot and a readily defensible narrow neck.
To facilitate Butler’s advance on Richmond, two defensive positions on the 
lower James would have to be secured to protect the army’s lines of communications. 
The first was Wilson’s Wharf, a bluff on the south bank of the James that commanded 
the channel for some distance above and below. The second position was Fort 
Powhatan, the site of an unoccupied Confederate fortification on a bluff a few miles 
upriver from Wilson’s Wharf.
Assigned to carry out Butler’s plan of attack was Major General Quincy A. 
Gillmore’s X Army Corps and Major General William F. Smith’s XVIII Army Corps. 
Most of April 1864 was spent assembling various regiments scattered throughout all 
parts of Butler’s domain. The infantry and artillery components of the Army of the 
James numbered approximately 36,000 officers and enlisted men. Completing the 
army were approximately 3000 cavalrymen massed at Portsmouth under Brigadier 
General August V. Kautz, and 1800 black cavalrymen who would parallel the 
invasion fleet (Robertson 1987). When and if the cavalry detachments joined the 
main body, Butler would command a field army of some 40,800 men.
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While the Army of the James gathered near Yorktown, Butler was making 
preparations with Acting Rear Admiral Samuel Philips Lee of the United States 
Navy. Elements of S.P. Lee’s North Atlantic Blockading Squadron would occupy 
portions of the James River so as to protect the army’s debarkation from Confederate 
fleet action. Also, naval gunfire would support the troop landings until the army was 
established ashore and safely entrenched.
The Federal Departure  —  May 1864
Despite the enormous complexities o f such a joint army/navy operation, at 
4:00 A.M. on May 5, 1864, the fleet transporting and guarding Butler’s Army of the 
James cast off for its destination upriver. A half dozen of Admiral Lee’s vessels 
fronted the operation consisting of his flagship, Malvern, followed by the gunboats 
Dawn, Osceola, Commodore James, Commodore Morris and Shawseen. Next to 
follow were the numerous transports carrying, in order, Brigadier General Edward W. 
Hinck’s Third Division consisting of two brigades of United States Colored Troops 
(U.S.C.T.), the 15,000 white soldiers of the XVIII Corps, and the portions of the X 
Corps that had arrived in time for departure. Attending the troop ships were barges of 
siege equipment, followed by dozens of cargo and hospital ships. Admiral Lee’s 
ironclads -  The Roanoke, Onondaga, Tecumseh, Canonicus, Sagus and Atlanta (a 
recently captured ship of the Virginia class) -  defended the rear accompanied by a 
score of double ender gunboats and armed tugs (Longacre 1997).
Early on the afternoon of May 5, Butler’s riverbome soldiers at last arrived at 
Wilson’s Wharf and Fort Powhatan, the first destinations of the campaign. The initial 
landing party consisted of the First Brigade of Hinck’s division under the command
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of Brigadier General Edward Wild. The 1st and 22nd regiments U.S.C.T. captured 
Wilson’s Wharf without opposition and set to work felling trees and constructing a 
large earthen fortification. Meanwhile, the 10th and 37th regiments U.S.C.T. landed at 
Fort Powhatan, also without resistance. Butler realized retaining possession of 
Wilson’s Wharf and Fort Powhatan was key to maintaining an open supply route to 
City Point. Butler therefore entrusted the defense of these strategic garrisons to the 
U.S.C.T. as he believed they would fight more desperately than any white troops in 
order to prevent capture. He reasoned that as captured black soldiers would be 
returned into slavery (under Confederate President Jefferson Davis’ proclamation) 
and the white officers possibly murdered, there would be no danger o f surrender 
(Butler 1892).
By 4:00 P.M. Hinck’s Second Brigade, under the command of Colonel 
Samuel Duncan, reached City Point, a once active river port located a mile and a half 
down river from Bermuda Hundred. Duncan’s 4th, 5th, and 6th regiments of U.S.C.T. 
disembarked and quickly dispatched the handful of Confederate signalmen and 
guards stationed at the old wharf. While Hinck’s men were occupying City Point, the 
rest of the fleet continued to Bermuda Hundred. Except for a lone steamer and a few 
horsemen in the distance, the Confederates had not put up any resistance to the initial 
Union advance. However, Butler’s Army of the James would see action soon 
enough.
Edward Wild and the United States Colored Troops
At the beginning of the Civil War few Union policy makers foresaw a military 
role for African-American men, free or slave. Northern abolitionists may have
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identified slavery as the cornerstone of the Confederacy, but Northern politicians 
minimized the connection between secession and chattel bondage. In the eyes of 
Northern leaders, and most Northern whites for that matter, the conflict would be a 
war to preserve the Union, not to free the slaves.
However, as the Union army confronted its enemy in the field, the importance 
of slavery to the Southern war effort soon became evident. The Confederate armies 
depended heavily on the labor of slaves not only to construct fortifications, transport 
supplies, and perform camp services, but also raise and manufacture the goods needed 
to feed and fund the army. Slave labor helped maintain the Confederate war machine 
by performing services that freed Southern white men for battlefield service.
General Butler was one of the first to make the conclusion that winning the 
war required an assault upon the system of slavery in the South. In May 1861, three 
slaves commandeered a canoe and paddled to the safety of Union occupied Fort 
Monroe, Virginia. When a Confederate officer sought a return of the men based on 
the U.S. Fugitive Slave Law, Butler pointed out that since the state of Virginia had 
seceded from the Union, its citizens could no longer benefit from federal laws. 
Furthermore, Butler argued that as the Confederates had employed the slaves on a 
military project, and since slaves were considered “property,” the bondsmen were 
subject to confiscation as contraband of war according to international law. Butler 
not only refused to surrender the “property,” but also offered to pay the three men to 
build a bakery for the Union troops. In one bold action, Butler had not only 
established a policy for freeing runaway slaves, but also set a precedent for 
incorporating African-Americans into the Union war effort.
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Butler’s policy became law through the passage of the First Confiscation Act 
that authorized Federal officials to seize Confederate property, including slaves, that 
was being used in the war effort (Glatthaar 1990). By July 1862, Congress went a 
step further and passed the Second Confiscation Act that bestowed freedom to all 
slaves upon crossing Federal lines. Of special note within the legislation was Section 
II which
Authorized the President to receive into service of the United States, for 
the purpose of constructing entrenchments or performing camp duty, or 
other labor, or any military or naval service for which they were found to 
be competent, persons of African descent, and provided that such persons 
should be enrolled and organized, under such regulations not inconsistent 
with the Constitutions and laws as the President might prescribe
(Gladstone 1993)
Even with congressional approval, President Lincoln was still not ready to enroll 
blacks as soldiers in the Union Army throughout the remainder of 1862.
By 1863, as Union armies penetrated deeper into the South, the demands of 
large-scale war were pushing the Lincoln administration steadily towards authorizing 
black military service. Precedent supported the admission of African-Americans into 
the armed forces as black soldiers had fought valiantly in the American Revolution 
and the War of 1812. Finally, on January 2, 1863, Lincoln issued his Proclamation of 
Emancipation. The seventh paragraph of General of General Order No. 1 authorized 
that “such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the 
United States, to garrison Forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man 
vessels of all sorts in said service” (Gladstone 1993).
Once authorized, the recruitment of African-Americans into the military 
service proceeded at an almost breathless pace. By mid-1863, the administrative load 
forced the War Department to create a single entity called the Bureau of Colored
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Troops. The bureau was to systematize the process of raising black units and 
securing officers. Black commands changed from state designations to the United 
States Colored Troops (U.S.C.T.) and the various units became United States Colored 
Infantry, Artillery, or Cavalry. O f all the black regiments, only the 54th and 55th 
Massachusetts Infantry, 5th Massachusetts Cavalry, and the 29th Connecticut Infantry 
retained their original state designations (Glatthaar 1990).
Due to the controversial nature of the African-American military service, the 
Lincoln administration determined that whites should officer the new black 
regiments. By offering commissions to whites the War Department hoped to appease 
objections in and out of the army. Racial stereotypes played an important role in the 
decision to bar blacks from becoming officers. Since most white Northerners 
believed that black men lacked the innate ability to fight well given their supposed 
inferior character, the Federal government decided these new U.S.C.T. regiments 
would require committed and talented white officers to train and lead them.
Certainly one of the most committed and most talented white officers to lead 
the U.S.C.T. was the contentious Brigadier General Edward A. Wild (Figure 5). 
Initially chosen because of his uncompromising belief in the value of black soldiers, 
Wild was a Harvard-educated physician whose distrust of his superiors was only 
surpassed by his hatred of the Confederacy. Wild had already paid a high price for 
his patriotism. While serving as captain in the 1st Massachusetts he fought in the 
Battle of Seven Pines where his right hand was permanently damaged by a 
Confederate bullet. After recovering, Wild became colonel of the 35 Massachusetts 
only to severely injure his left arm up to the shoulder (Trudeau 1998).
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Figure 5. Union Brig. Gen. Edward A. Wild (from MASS-MOLLUS Collection
& USAMHI)
By October 1863, Wild’s recruiting efforts had mustered into U.S. service the 
2nd Regiment of North Carolina Volunteers. Also under his command were the 1st 
U.S.C.T. from the District of Columbia, and the 5th U.S.C.T. from Delaware, Ohio. 
Wild and his troops spent the remaining days of 1863 raiding and generally 
terrorizing guerrillas and citizens in North Carolina.
By May 1864, Wild became part of General Benjamin Butler’s invasion force 
that sailed upriver bound for Bermuda Hundred. The assignment to protect the 
supply line of the Army of the James went to Brigadier General Edward Hincks’ 
black division. This was a two-brigade division, with the First under the command of
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Wild and the Second under Colonel Samuel Duncan. Wild’s Brigade consisted of the 
1st (District of Columbia), 10th (Virginia), 22nd (Camp William Penn), and 37th 
U.S.C.T. (from North Carolina) while Duncan’s comprised the 4th, 5th, and 6th 
U.S.C.T. (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Officers and men of the 1st Regiment United States Colored Troops at 
an unidentified location (Library of Congress).
Action at Wilson's Wharf
Throughout May 1864, Butler and his army made demonstrations toward 
Petersburg, engaging General P.G.T. Beauregard’s Confederates at major battles such 
as Port Walthall Junction, Chester Station, and Drewry’s Bluff. However, for the 
U.S.C.T. stationed at Wilson’s Wharf and Fort Powhatan the majority of the month 
was spent fortifying, guarding, and patrolling. As in North Carolina, Wild continued 
to take the war to the local populace by raiding the surrounding countryside from his 
base at Wilson’s Wharf. Throughout the occupation of the fort the so-called 
“foraging parties” pillaged local plantations causing many landholders to flee the area 
(Arter 1864). Wild’s reign of terror reached a head when a foraging party captured a
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local planter named William Clopton, who had earlier severely beaten several female
slaves. In a May 10th letter to the Christian Recorder, Sergeant George Hatton (1864)
described how the Union troops enacted revenge on the notorious slave owner:
On the arrival of Mr.C. in camp, the commanding officer determined to 
let the women have their revenge, and ordered Mr.C. to be tied to a tree 
in front of head-quarters, and William Harris, a soldier in our regiment 
(1st U.S.C.T) and a member of Co. E, who was acquainted with the 
gentlemen, and who used to belong to him, was called upon to undress 
him and introduce him to the ladies that I mentioned before. Mr. Harris 
played his part conspicuously, bringing the blood from his loins at every 
stroke, and not forgetting to remind the gentleman of the days gone by.
After giving him some fifteen or twenty well-directed strokes, the ladies, 
one after another, came up and gave him a like number, to remind him 
that they were no longer his, but safely housed in Abraham’s bosom, and 
under the protection of the Star Spangled Banner, and guarded by their 
own patriotic, though once down-trodden race. Oh, that I had the tongue 
to express my feeling while standing upon the banks of the James River, 
on the soil of Virginia, the mother state of slavery, as a witness of such a 
sudden reverse!
(Hatton in Redkey 1992:93-94)
The real and imagined fears brought about by the thought of black Union 
soldiers operating freely in the heart of Virginia caused a general outrage amongst 
Virginians. Letters to the Richmond Examiner accused Wild’s soldiers not only of 
robbing, burning, and plundering, but also of bayoneting and nailing no less than 
three white citizens to trees and making some ladies “victims of their hellish 
appetites...” (May 1864). By May 23, the Confederate army could no longer tolerate 
the presence of the black soldiers at Wilson’s Wharf and General Braxton Bragg sent 
a force commanded by Major General Fitzhugh Lee to “break up the nest and stop 
their uncivilized proceedings in the neighborhood” (Fitzhugh Lee’s Postwar Report
(FLPR) 1866).
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Fitzhugh Lee, the nephew of famed Confederate General Robert E. Lee, was a 
West Point graduate who served with the 2nd United States Cavalry in Texas (Figure 
7). In 1859, while fighting Comanches, Lee was severely injured when an arrow
Figure 7. Confederate Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee (author’s collection).
passed under his arm and through both lungs (Nichols 1989). After a long leave in 
the summer of 1860, Lee was ordered to West Point to serve as instructor of cavalry 
tactics (Nichols 1989). After the secession of Virginia from the Union on April 17, 
1861, Lee left West Point and tendered his resignation. In late July 1861, Lee was 
commissioned a Lieutenant Colonel in the Virginia Volunteers and assigned to the 
First Virginia Cavalry. By 1864, Lee had quickly advanced to the rank of Major 
General.
At the time of the attack on Wilson’s Wharf, Fitzhugh Lee’s Confederate 
force comprised 800 men from Brigadier General William Wickham’s Brigade (1st,
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2nd, 3rd, 4th, Virginia Cavalry Regiments); 750 men from Brigadier General Lunsford 
Lomax’s Brigade (5th, 6th, 15th Virginia Cavalry Regiments); 420 men from Brigadier 
General James Gordon’s Brigade (1st, 2nd, 5th North Carolina Cavalry Regiments);
tViand approximately 500 men from Colonel John Dunovant’s 5 South Carolina 
Cavalry Regiment. One artillery gun accompanied the expedition under the 
command of Lt. Marcellus Moorman (Rhea 2000, Besch n.d.) (Table 1).
Lee’s force of approximately 2500 men left Atlee’s Station (northeast of 
Richmond) and after an all night ride arrived at Wilson’s Wharf around 11 a.m. on 
May 24. At the time of Lee’s arrival, Wild had 900 infantry in ten companies of the 
1st regiment U.S.C.T. and four companies of the 10th regiment U.S.C.T. The 10th 
regiment U.S.C.T. had recently replaced the 22nd regiment U.S.C.T. that transferred 
to Fort Powhatan during the middle of May. Wild was supported by two 10-pounder 
rifled Parrott guns from Battery M, 3rd New York Light Artillery (which replaced the 
6-pounder howitzers from Battery B, 2nd U.S.C. Light Artillery), 2nd Lieutenant Julius 
M. Swain’s signal detachment, and the gunboat U.S.S. Dawn commanded by Navy 
Acting Lieutenant J.W. Simmons.
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Table 1
Confederate and Union participants at the Battle of Wilson’s Wharf
Confederate participants (approx, 2,500) 
Army of Northern Virginia
Fitzhugh Lee’s Division, Cavalry Corps
Wickham’s Brigade (800 men)
1st Virginia Cavalry Regiment 
2nd Virginia Cavalry Regiment 
3rd Virginia Cavalry Regiment 
4th Virginia Cavalry Regiment 
Dunovant’s Brigade (1,250 men)1 
5th Virginia Cavalry Regiment 
6th Virginia Cavalry Regiment 
15th Virginia Cavalry Regiment 
5th South Carolina Cavalry Regiment 
Gordon’s Brigade (420 men)2
1 st North Carolina Cavalry Regiment 
2nd North Carolina Cavalry Regiment 
5th North Carolina Cavalry Regiment
Union participants (approx. 1,000) 
Army of the James
Edward Hincks’ Third Division, 
XVIH Corps,
Wild’s Brigade
1st Regiment USCT 
10th Regiment USCT 
3rd New York Light 
Artillery, Battery M
1 Lomax did not accompany the expedition, and his brigade was commanded by Dunovant.
2 Gordon died on May 18 and was succeeded by Col. Clinton M. Andrews.
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The action began around noon with a mounted Confederate cavalry charge on
Union pickets posted some distance in front of the fort (Figure 8). Companies C and
F of the 1st Regiment U.S.C.T. checked the Confederates, but some of the Union
soldiers were cut off and captured (Nasca et al 1998). Following the attack on the
Union pickets Lee had his cavalrymen dismount and a line of skirmishers advance on
the Federal works. Although the earthworks were only partially finished, Lee found
the fortifications strongly manned. Lieutenant Edward Simonton, Company I, 1st
Regiment, U.S.C.T. described the earthworks at the time of the engagement:
Along one-third of the line ran a ditch 8 feet wide and 5-6 feet 
deep.. .along the remaining part was no ditch at all; abatis constructed 
simply of felled trees and trimmed branches and limbs placed outside the 
ditch. Our intrenchments were only about one-third completed when 
General Lee’s force came upon us suddenly. Along the unfinished 
portion of our line, the enemy could easily and successfully have charged 
upon the works, but our men were ready for them.
(Besch n.d.)
Henry Turner, African-American Chaplain of the 1st U.S.C.T., described his
tense excitement in witnessing the repulse of the initial Confederate advance:
Things moved quietly until the 24th.. .when my attention was called to 
the front of the works by a mighty rushing to arms, and shouts that the 
rebels were coming. I immediately joined the proclaiming host and 
bellowed out (I reckon in fearful tones) “The rebels! The Rebels! The 
Rebels are coming!” At this period the long roll began tell that doleful 
tale that she never tells unless the enemy is about to invade our quarters.
Then commenced another rush to arms, fearful in its aspect.
Notwithstanding many were at dinner, down fell the plates, knives, forks 
and cups, and a few moments only were required to find every man, sick 
or well, drawn into the line of battle to dispute the advance of twice, if 
not thrice, their number of rebels. Captains Borden and Rich of the 1st 
U.S. Col’d Troops, with their gallant companies, were at some distance 
in front, skirmishing with the advance guard of the rebels. And here 
permit me to say, that this skirmish was the grandest sight I ever beheld.
(Turner in Redkey 1992:96-9)
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Figure 8. Battle of Wilson’s Wharf, first phase (USGS aerial photo).
Chaplain Turner then notes that by the time the pickets were driven into the 
fort, a flag of truce could be seen waving in the distance. Lee had dispatched Major 
R.J. Mason and John Gill with a message stating “he had force enough to take the
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place, demand its surrender and in that case the garrison should be turned over to the 
authorities at Richmond as prisoners of war, but if this proposition was rejected he 
would not be answerable for consequences when he took the place” (Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Armies {ORUCA} 1891). General Wild declined the 
offer by simply replying, “We will try it,” a phrase he used before attempting a 
difficult problem (ORUCA 1891).
As Gill returned Wild’s response, news of the battle was attracting the 
attention of naval ships stationed nearby. The transport Thomas Powell landed some 
150 unarmed soldiers at the garrison, including six men form the 1st Connecticut 
Heavy Artillery. The gunners replaced several of the New York artillerymen who 
had dropped with heat exhaustion and Private John Taylor who had been wounded in 
the face (ORUCA 1891, Besch n.d.). Another transport, the Young America, was 
stationed between Wilson’s Wharf and Fort Powhatan and subsequently ordered into 
action when the attack commenced. However, the transport was disabled at the time 
of the attack due to boiler problems and had to be towed to the engagement by the 
army tug Johnson (Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies {ORUCN} 
1900: 88).
Back on land, Wild’s decline to surrender caused Lee to deploy his troops for 
battle. Wickham and Gordon’s Brigade were to assault Wild’s strongest position 
while Dunovant’s 5th South Carolina Cavalry with Lomax’s Brigade were to create a 
diversion against the weakest portion and fire on vessels on the James River (FLPR 
1866) (Figure 9). Wild reported how the Confederates “massed troops on our 
extreme right, concealed by wooded ravines, and made a determined charge, at the
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same time keeping up a steady attack all along our front and left flank” (ORUCA 
1891: 270). The Confederate soldiers located on Wild’s extreme right (east side of 
the fort) consisted of Gordon’s Brigade, with the 5th North Carolina Cavalry closest to 
the James River, and Wickham’s Brigade of Virginia Cavalry. Colonel Dunovant 
commanded his own regiment and Lomax’s Brigade against Wild’s left wing (FLPR 
1866). Lee directed Dunovant to “make a demonstration upon the upper and opposite 
side, with a view to drawing the garrison in his front whilst Wickham got in” (FLPR 
1866). Therefore, while Dunovant attracted the attention of the defenders from the 
west and north side of the fortification, Wickham would move his dismounted troops 
along a circuitous route through the wooded ravines of Kennons Creek.
Dunovant’s men raised havoc on the Union signal station and passing 
transports when a Confederate detachment succeeded in gaining possession of a small 
piece o f woods to the west of the fortification. Signal Officer, 2nd Lieutenant Julius 
Swain, reported how the sharpshooters, numbering approximately 100, gained 
possession of the heavy-timbered point on the river not more than 70 yards from the 
signal station. Swain recalled how the enemy “opened fire upon us so fiercely that 
we were forced to abandon our post and seek protection behind the earthworks” 
(ORUCA 1891: 272). After a half hour delay, Swain opened a signal station on board 
a transport near the wharf and directed the fire of the gunboat against Wickham’s 
charge of the Union right.
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Figure 9. Battle of Wilson’s Wharf, second phase (USGS aerial photo).
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One transport in particular, the Mayflower, also absorbed the brunt of
Dunovant’s attack. The scene of the heroic actions of Acting Ensign William Chase,
who took charge of the vessel when the captain and pilot were severely wounded,
were described by Lieutenant Simmons of the U.S.S. Dawn;
On the Mayflower passing the woods above me, where the enemy’s 
sharpshooters had got possession, they poured a murderous volley of 
musketry on the Mayflower, badly wounding the captain and pilot of the 
boat, leaving her completely at their mercy. Mr. Chase at once jumped 
to the wheel and brought the boat safely through the terrific fire poured 
at him.
(ORUCN 1900:91)
Chase then proceeded to land the vessel at the wharf, at which point General Wild 
commandeered it for the use of transporting the wounded.
After the attack on the Mayflower, the gunboat U.S.S. Dawn opened fire on 
Dunovant’s sharpshooters and succeeded in driving the soldiers out of their wooded 
position (ORUCN 1900:90). As the firing ceased on the Union left, the Dawn moved 
down the river in time to encounter the Confederate charge on the Union right. The 
gunboat fired on the Confederates without mercy expending a total of 118 rounds of 
ammunition consisting of:
100-pounder rifle: 46 rounds percussion shell
20-pounder rifle: 34 rounds percussion shell, 1 round 10-second shell 
Rifled 12-pounder howitzer: 11 rounds percussion shell, 21-rounds 5-second
shell, 3 rounds canister, 2 rounds grape 
(ORUCN 1900:91)
Even with the destructive amount of ordinance expended at the battle, two 
Union officers lamented their deficiency of artillery. The commander of the Dawn, 
Lieutenant Simmons, reported that if he “had two 32-pounders in addition to my 
present battery, I could do much more service, having now no smoothbore guns to 
throw grape and canister” (ORUCN 1891:271).
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Confederates described the terrifying sight of the 100-pounder ordinance fired 
from the Dawn. The shells looked like “turkey gobblers flying over” recollected a 
man in the 2nd Virginia Cavalry (Gill 1905). Private Paul Means of the 5th North 
Carolina Cavalry remembered the ordinance as “great black masses, as big as nail 
kegs, hurtling in the air and making the earth tremble under us and the atmosphere jar 
and quake around us when they burst” (Means 1901). Means also noted the 
devastating effect of one of the large shells on a comrade: “it passed at least ten feet 
from him and paralyzed his right arm by concussion of air. There was no visible 
injury, but it fell useless and quickly turned black, he never recovered its use” (Means 
1901).
Private Henry St. George Tucker Brooke, Co. B, 2nd Virginia Cavalry
participated in Wickham’s charge and described the action just prior to the assault:
(We) marched through the woods to the river (Kennons Creek) below the 
fort. The undergrowth was thick and the land swampy. We drew up in 
line of battle. (We) charged across a field and suddenly came to a deep 
ravine 50 yards across. The enemy had poured a destructive fire into the 
column as it charged across the field. The trees on each side had been 
cut.. .and formed an impenetrable thicket on each side. When the 
charging column reached the ravine it came to an abrupt halt.
(Brooke in Besch n.d.)
After the halt in the ravine, a signal gun fired and Wickham’s men charged 
into the cleared ground around the fort. As the Confederates rushed forward, Private 
Means reported, “The Negroes, with uncovered heads, rose above the entrenchments 
and leveled their guns upon us. Then came a cloud of smoke.. .bullets whizzed 
through our ranks, and the men in our lines tumbled over each other, some forward, 
some backward” (Means 1901). Wickham’s men made a determined charge and 
approached a parapet, however, they were driven back under severe crossfire
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(ORUCA 1891:270). Means recollected the failed attempt; “we were within 30 feet 
of the fort when we saw the utter hopelessness of the attack. The line halted a 
moment; the order to retreat was given, and we retired under fire from the most 
useless and unwise attack and the most signal failure we were ever engaged in” 
(Means 1901) (Figure 10).
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Figure 10. Battle of Wilson’s Wharf, final phase (USGS aerial photo).
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Despite the initial optimism of the Confederate charge, the Union 
fortifications, reinforced during the day by the remaining four companies of the 10th 
U.S.C.T., proved too strong for Lee’s forces. Lee withdrew shortly after dusk and his 
defeated troops retired to Charles City Court House. Wild initially reported his losses 
at 2 killed, 19 wounded, and 1 missing. However, the June 11,1864 Harper s Ferry 
reported 7 Union dead and 40 wounded. Confederate losses were higher, ranging 
from 175 to 200, with a reasonable estimate of 180 total Confederate casualties 
during the action at Wilson’s Wharf (Besch n.d.).
Chaplain Henry Turner bragged regarding the African-American soldiers role 
in the engagement:
The 1st Regiment of the United States Colored Troops, with a very 
small exception, did all the fighting...The coolness and cheerfulness of 
the men, the precision with which they shot, and the vast number of 
rebels they unmercifully slaughtered, won for them the highest regard 
of both the General and his staff, and every white soldier that was on 
the field.
(Turner in Redkey 1992:97-98) 
Turner then continued by dismissing the Confederate effort:
Allow me to say that the rebels were handsomely whipped. They fled 
before our men, carrying a large number of their dead, and leaving a 
great many on the field for us to bury. They declared our regiment 
were sharpshooters.
(Turner in Redkey 1992:98) 
North Carolina Private Means appeared to agree with Turner’s evaluation of the 
expedition when he called it “the most useless sacrifice of time and men and horses 
made during the war” (Means 1901).
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Occupation o f  Fort Pocahontas
After the action on May 24, the fortifications at Wilson’s Wharf were 
completed and renamed Fort Pocahontas. By mid-June, Ohio National Guard troops 
of the 143rd and 163rd Regiments replaced the U.S.C.T. who were eventually assigned 
to the operations at Petersburg and City Point. The guardsmen remained until the end 
of August when their 100 days of service ended. On June 23, Captain A. R. Arter of 
the 143rd U.S. Regiment wrote a letter describing the conditions at the fort. Arter 
characterized the “breastworks” at Wilson’s Wharf as “the best arranged.. .1 have ever 
seen” (Arter 1864). A few weeks earlier, Union engineers had prepared a plan of the 
works that indicated the location of the headquarters of General Wild within the 
fortification (Weitzel 1864) (Figure 11).
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Figure 11. “Sketch of Works at Wilson’s Wharf or Landing” (Weitzel 
1864;Library of Virginia).
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Captain Arter stated that there were about 1000 soldiers armed with Sharp’s 
repeating rifles in addition to “one full artillery company composed of some 12 or 15 
heavy cannon” (Arter 1864). It appears Arter was referring to the arms and artillery 
added after the battle to strengthen the fort’s defensive as the Union infantry (1st and 
10th U.S.C.T.) and Union artillery (Battery M, 3rd New York Light artillery) who 
participated in the battle were outfitted with .58 caliber Springfields or Enfields and 
two 10-pounder rifled Parrott guns, respectively.
In September 1864, the 89th New York and two regiments of U.S.C.T. who 
had replaced the Ohio troops were reassigned and replaced with companies of 
soldiers from New York and New Jersey (ORUCA 1891:88). These soldiers, 
primarily members of the 38th New Jersey and 16th New York Heavy Artillery 
Companies E and H, comprised the core of the forces stationed at Fort Pocahontas 
from October 1864 through the end of the war.
CHAPTER V.
ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE BATTLE OF WILSON’S
WHARF
Between October 23-November 4, 2000 the William and Mary Center for 
Archaeological Research (WMCAR) conducted an archaeological investigation at the 
site of Fort Pocahontas in Charles City County Virginia. The investigation was 
funded through a grant from the National Park Service American Battlefield 
Protection Program (ABPP). The project objective was to identify and document the 
American Civil War battle known as Wilson’s Wharf in order to evaluate and 
preserve archaeological evidence of the May 24, 1864 conflict. The project also 
sought to demonstrate the value of a systematic metal detector survey combined with 
in-depth historical research as a means of delineating troop positions within a 
battlefield site. At the Wilson’s Wharf site the positions represented the attacking 
Confederate cavalry under the command of Major General Fitzhugh Lee, and the 
defending Union infantry under Brigadier General Edward Wild.
In previous archaeological reports the site area has been referred to as Fort 
Pocahontas from the name of the Union fortification located on the property. 
However, as the fortification was not finished and named until after the conflict, the 
site area will herein be referred to as Wilson’s Wharf in accordance with the Union 
title for the engagement. The designation is appropriate given the objective of the 
survey to identify the archaeological remains associated with the Battle o f Wilson’s 
Wharf. The Confederate army also referred to the action as the Battle of Kennon’s or
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Kennons Landing, however this was not a commonly used name and therefore will 
not be employed in the report.
Description o f  the Study Area
Wilson’s Wharf/Fort Pocahontas is situated approximately 1.5 miles south of 
Route 5 in Charles City County, Virginia, on the north shore of the James River. 
Kennon’s Creek and its associated drainage ravines encompass the northeastern and 
eastern face of the earthworks (see Figure 1 and 2). The fortification is located less 
than 5 miles east of Sherwood Forest, the plantation home of the late President of the 
United States, John Tyler. The study area is currently owned by Mr. Harrison Tyler, 
grandson of the late President, and is defined by the natural boundaries o f the James 
River to the south and Kennon Creek to the east. The northern boundary of the study 
area is defined by the limit of the property owned by Mr. Tyler. A dirt road leading 
south from County Road 614 to the James River bisects the fortification into eastern 
and western halves.
Prior to European contact, this region of Virginia supported a varied biotic 
community. Oak/hickory hardwood forests, whose ground cover and seasonal mast 
production supported many species, dominated the elevated river terraces while pines 
and mixed pine hardwoods dominated the interior uplands (Hodges 1996).
The arrival of European settlers impacted the study area in a variety of ways. 
Forests were cleared for settlement, timber, and later for planting crops. Most of the 
study area was plowed during the historic occupation of the site, excluding the 
ravines and low-lying areas. Impacts on the project area within the past 100 years
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have included episodes of gravel mining, cultivation and the clear-cut timbering of 
the regenerated pine forest.
The shift from farming to timbering by site landowners during the twentieth 
century allowed the cultivated land within the study area to be returned to forest. 
Logging of the area surrounding the fortification provides the greatest threat to the 
site with the most recent episode occurring within the past decade. Future logging 
will occur as the plantings mature. The removal of trees, the destruction caused by 
heavy machinery, and the replanting and growth of new trees will each cause a major 
disturbance to the landscape, and, thereby, lead to the loss of archaeological resources 
within the site boundaries.
Another potential threat is vandalism caused by relic seekers who destroy the 
integrity of a site solely for the perceived material and monetary value of the artifacts 
of war. In the past, local “hunt clubs” were allowed access to the fort environs so 
they might loot battle remains from the site. Fortunately, relic hunters are no longer 
welcome on the property.
Definition o f  Study Areas
As the purpose of the present study was to identify and document the Civil 
War engagement referred to as the action at Wilson’s Wharf, it was the first necessary 
to analyze historical accounts of the battle in order to place troop movements within 
the landscape. Documentation indicated the Confederate attack encompassed the 
Union left (west), center (north), and right (east), with the main thrust occurring on 
the east of the fortification. Reconnaissance of the site environs identified thirteen 
areas totaling 1,360,000 sq. ft. to be investigated as containing possible battle related
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12). The areas were chosen based on their accessibility and probable location within 
the historically documented line of the Confederate attack (Table 2).
2 5 0  m e te r s
AR EA  1 
AREA  2
A REA 3-L E E 'S  RAVINE
AREA  4-PO W ERLIN E CUT
A REA 6-LA RG E CIRCU LA R RISE
AREA 6-RAVINE FINGER 1
AREA  7-PROM ONTORY
AREA  8-RAVINE FINGER 2
AREA  9-CEM ETERY KNOLL
AREA 10-EA STER N  CLEA RED  AREA
AREA 11-W ESTERN  C LEA RED  AREA
AREA 12-PARKIN G LOT
AREA 13-W ESTE RN  SHORELINE
Figure 12. Wilson’s Wharf Battlefield survey examination areas (USGS aerial 
photo).
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Table 2
Summary of sampling coverage by area
S t u d y  A r e a P r o p o s e d A c h ie v e d
C o v e r a g e C o v e r a g e
(SQ. FT.) (SQ. FT.)
Area 1 260,000 93,000 (35%)
Area 2 170,000 28,000(16.5%)
Area 3 200,000 200,000 (100%)
Area 4 90,000 90,000 (100%)
Area 5 200,000 7,500 (4%)
Area 6 50,000 50,000 (100%)
Area 7 5,000 5,000 (100%)
Area 8 12,500 2,500 (100%)
Area 9 62,500 62,500 (100%)
Area 10 30,000 30,000 (100%)
Area 11 0 0
Area 12 50,000 50,000 (100%)
Area 13 30,000 30,000 (100%)
Total 1,360,000 658,500 (48%)
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Area 1
Area one represents a 260,000 sq. ft. (800 ft. north-south by 325 ft. east-west) 
tract located to the west of the main access road approximately 100 ft. north of the 
west bastion of the fortification. The area was chosen to determine if evidence of the 
frontal Confederate attack could be identified. Direct access to the ground surface 
was hindered in Area 1 as the section contained new growth pine and dense 
undergrowth. At the request of the landowner, the pine trees were cleared for the 
survey only within sample 
transects (Figure 13). The pine 
and underbrush were removed 
within a total of seven transects 
representing a 35% sample of 
Area 1. Transects 1-5 were each 
20 ft. in width and extended the 
length (800 ft.) of the survey area 
on a north-south orientation.
Transects A and B were placed at 
the northern end of Area 1 and 
were 20 ft. in width, extending 
the width of the survey area (325 
ft.) on an east-west orientation.
Figure 13. Photograph of Area 1, Transect 1
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Area 2
Area 2 represents a 170,000 sq. ft. (200 ft. north-south by 850 ft. east-west) 
area located approximately 100 ft. to the north of Lee’s Ravine within a large bend in 
the secondary east-west access road. The area was chosen to determine if any 
evidence of the initial Confederate attack on the Union pickets could be identified.
As within Area 1, the ground surface in Area 2 was inaccessible as the section was 
overgrown with small pine trees and thorny underbrush. The vegetation was removed 
within seven transects representing a 16.5% sample of area 2. Each transect was 20 
ft. in width and extended the length (200 ft.) of the survey on a north-south 
orientation.
Area 3 (Lee’s Ravine)
Area 3 is the natural topographic feature referred to as Lee’s Ravine and is 
part of the drainage system of nearby Kennon’s Creek (Figure 14). Area 3 represents 
an approximately 200,000 sq. ft. portion of the natural feature located to the north of 
the fortification. The boundaries of Area 3 are formed by the natural edges of the 
ravine to the north, west, and 
south. The eastern boundary of 
Area 3 is marked by a swamp that 
continues through Lee’s Ravine 
along the eastern side of the 
fortification eventually draining 
into Kennon’s Creek. The ravine
Figure 14. Photograph of Area 3
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was investigated to determine if the feature was the “circuitous and wooded route” 
employed by the Confederates to conceal the movements for Wickham’s main attack 
on the eastern or strongest portion of the garrison. The vegetation of the ravine 
consists of large, widely dispersed trees interspersed with a thin grass cover. The 
grass cover was easily mowed throughout Area 3 thereby allowing for nearly 100% 
coverage of the ground surface.
Area 4 (Powerline Cut)
Area 4 represents a powerline cut cleared by Dominion Virginia Power 
shortly before the start of the project. The cut was added to the scope of the project 
as the removal of vegetation within this area afforded the opportunity to examine the 
western extent of the property. The powerline cut is 1800 sq. ft. in length east-west 
and 50 ft. in width north-south (90,000 sq. ft.). Area 4 was investigated for evidence 
of Dunovant’s feint attack on the Union left.
Area 5 (Large Circular Rise)
Area 5 is a large circular rise located approximately 125 ft. to the north of the 
east bastion. The rise is located below the southern edge of Lee’s Ravine (Area 3) 
where the natural feature turns from an east-west to a southern course. Area 5 is 
approximately 200,000 sq. ft., however, due to the extremely overgrown nature of the 
rise sample transects could not be placed within the area in time for the survey. Only 
a small 150 ft. by 50 ft. (7500 sq. ft.) portion of area 5 was cleared representing a 4% 
sample. The sample is situated above a cut leading down into Lee’s ravine and was 
investigated as one possible route for the main charge of Wickham’s Brigade from
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out of the ravine. The sample area, while small, displayed evidence of heavy fighting 
near the cut in the ravine.
Area 6 (Ravine Finger 1)
Area 6 is a ravine cut which is part of the drainage features for Lee’s Ravine. 
The cut is bounded to the west by the east wall of the fortification, to the east by 
Lee’s Ravine, to the south by Area 7 (Narrow Promontory), and to the north by Area 
5 (Large Circular Rise). The cut leads into the swamp within Lee’s Ravine. Area 6 is 
approximately 50,000 sq. ft. (250 ft. east-west by 200 ft. north-south) and contained a 
dense cover of thorny underbrush that was removed. The removal of the vegetation 
allowed for a 100% coverage of the area during the survey. Area 6 was investigated 
to determine if it contained evidence of Wickham’s main charge as the cut leads 
directly to the eastern face of the fortification and could have been employed as a 
path of attack from Lee’s Ravine.
Area 7 (Narrow Promontory)
Area 7 is a narrow promontory located between two ravine cuts (Area 6 and 
Area 8). Area 7 is approximately 5000 sq. ft. (200 ft. east-west by 20 ft. north-south) 
and contained a dense cover thorny underbrush that was removed. The removal of 
the vegetation allowed for 100% coverage of the area during the survey. Area 7 was 
examined for evidence of Wickham’s charge against the eastern side of the 
fortification.
Area 8 (Ravine Finger 2)
Area 8 is a second ravine cut located to the east of the fortification. The cut is 
bounded by Area 7 (Narrow Promontory) to the north, Lee’s Ravine to east, the
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fortification to the west and Area 9 (Cemetery Knoll) to the south. Area 8 is 
approximately 12,500 sq. ft. (250 ft. east-west by 50 ft. north-south) and contained a 
dense thorny underbrush that was removed. The removal of the vegetation allowed 
for 100% coverage of Area 8 during the survey. As with Area 6, Area 8 was 
examined to determine if Wickham’s Confederates employed the ravine finger as a 
path of attack against the eastern face of the fortification.
Area 9 (Cemetery Knoll)
Area 9 is the Cemetery Knoll first identified during the 1997 field season. 
The knoll is bounded by the fortification to the west, the swamp within Lee’s Ravine 
to the east, Area 8 to the north, and the James River to the south. The knoll is 
approximately 62,500 sq. ft. (250 ft. by 250 ft.) and contains a grass cover that 
facilitated the 100% coverage of Area 9 during the survey. Area 9 was examined to 
determine the southern most extent of the Confederate attack against the garrison. 
Area 10 (Eastern Cleared Area)
Area 10, also known as the Eastern Cleared Area, is an approximately
185,000 sq. ft. section located directly north of the fortification and east of the main 
access road. The WMCAR conducted a metal detector survey within the majority 
(approximately 155,000 sq. ft.) of the Eastern Cleared Area during the 1997 field 
season. However, a portion of Area 10 (approximately 30,000 sq. ft.) was not 
accessible at the time of the original investigation. As the additional portion of Area 
10 was cleared by the time of the 2000 ABPP battlefield survey, it was determined 
the small area be added to the scope of the project. The area is located directly north
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of the east bastion and was examined for evidence of Wickham’s main Confederate 
charge on the fortification.
Area 11 (Western Cleared Area)
Area 11, also referred to as the Western Cleared Area, is an approximately
45,000 sq. ft. section located directly north of the fortification and west of the main 
access road. As the Western Cleared Are a was previously investigated during the 
1997 WMCAR metal detector survey, Area 11 was not reexamined during the 2000 
ABPP survey.
Area 12
Area 12, defined as Area A in Nasca 1998, is an approximately 50,000 sq. ft. 
parking lot area designated for visitors to the site. A portion of the parking lot 
consists of a gravel fill while the remainder of Area 12 is covered with short grass. 
Only the portion of Area 12 with a grass cover was surveyed to determine if the 
parking lot contained evidence of the Confederate frontal assault on the fortification. 
Area 13
Area 13, also referred to as the Western Shoreline, is a 30,000 sq. ft. (100 ft. 
north-south by 300 ft. east-west) area located approximately 2000 ft. from the western 
side of the fortification on a bluff overlooking the James River. The area appears to 
have been used as a camping location in recent years and was therefore relatively free 
of underbrush allowing for easy access to the ground surface. The lack of vegetation 
permitted the archaeologist to survey Area 13 in its entirety. Area 13 was examined 
to determine if the bluff was the “small piece of woods to the west o f the
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fortification” taken by Dunovant’s men from which the Confederates raised havoc on 
passing transports and the Union signal station.
Field Methods
The field investigations at Wilson’s Wharf followed the techniques developed 
in 1984 by Dr. Douglas Scott at the Little Bighorn Battlefield Site (Scott and Fox 
1987). The fieldwork consisted of three sequential operations: survey, recovery and 
recording. The survey phase was designed to locate subsurface metallic items 
associated with the battle through the use of electronic metal detectors. Standard 
archaeological survey methods involving visual surface collection and subsurface 
shovel tests were determined to be inadequate for the present study given the large 
size and overgrown nature of the Wilson’s Wharf battlefield environs. Another 
limiting factor was the short amount of time available to conduct the investigation.
All fieldwork was to take place within a one-week span and therefore an efficient and 
effective means of examining the site was necessary. As the vast majority of 
surviving battlefield artifacts are composed of iron, lead and copper alloy, a 
systematic metal detector survey was chosen as it would allow a relatively small crew 
to employ the most productive method of recovering the physical remains of the 
engagement. While the use of metal detectors in the field of archaeology has slowly 
become more accepted in recent years, the application of the technology has been 
mostly embraced by military and battlefield-site researchers (Adams 2000, 2000); 
Gregory and Rogerson 1984; Haecker 1997, 1998; Ludwig and Stute 1993; Nasca 
1998; Pratt 1995; Scott 1987, 1989, 1998).
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As the main goal of the project was the identification and documentation of 
the battle remains of the action at Wilson’s Wharf, it was determined that a transect 
technique would be the most appropriate method for revealing the spatial and 
temporal aspects of the engagement. A transect is a long, narrow sample unit as 
opposed to the quadrant, a square unit whose location within the sample universe is 
determined arbitrarily or at random. While both sampling methods are equally 
accurate in estimating artifact frequency and numeric abundance, transects are 
considered more accurate in the estimation of distribution (Mueller 1975, Hacker 
1998).
The size and placement of transects within the site areas were influenced not 
only by the historical record, but also by the density and type of vegetation. In areas 
3-13, all underbrush within the area was mowed to facilitate the metal detectors’ 
direct access to the ground. Within these cleared areas the survey transects were 
tightly spaced allowing for almost 100% coverage. However, Areas 1 and 2 
contained new growth pine and were not completely cleared at the request of the 
landowner. As a result, the small trees and undergrowth were only cleared within 
seven 6-foot transects running the length of the two areas. The transects within Areas 
1 and 2 followed a northwest-southeast orientation.
Each site area was systematically surveyed by a total of five metal detector 
technicians (Figure 15). The operators were spaced approximately two meters apart
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in order to prohibit the machines from electronically interfering with one another. 
While maintaining the two-meter interval, each technician slowly proceeded to sweep 
the detector at arms length while transecting the site area. Once a transect was 
completed, each operator shifted over to examine the two meters previously left as a 
buffer zone. This process continued 
until each site was investigated, 
ensuring complete ground coverage.
Only in Areas 1 and 2 did the 
process vary whereby only the 
cleared sample rows were fully 
investigated. Figure 15. Archaeologist conducting survey
As artifact locations were detected, each operator immediately excavated their 
own targets (Figure 16). Each artifact location was given a separate pin flag with one 
color representing all Civil War related artifacts and a second indicating all non-Civil 
War related artifacts. The pin flags allowed the technicians to visually determine the 
location of artifacts within the site 
areas for mapping purposes (Figure 
17). All non-Civil War related 
artifacts were left in situ. All 
possible Civil War related artifacts 
were given a unique specimen
number, individually bagged, Figure 16. Recovered bullet in situ
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and collected by the project archaeologist. The specimen number was recorded in a 
notebook and labeled on the associated pin flag. The number was then stamped on a 
small metal tag that was placed in the excavation location. The tag served as a
secondary locator in case of the 
disturbance of the pin flag prior 
to mapping. The depth of each 
artifact was noted in order to
location of the specimen. 
Figure 17. Artifact locations marked by pin flags
After all the site areas were thoroughly examined, each possible Civil War 
artifact was mapped with reference to an existing grid using a Nikon DTM-300 
Electronic Distance Measurer (EDM) (Figure 18). The information gathered by the
EDM was downloaded and
the mapping program, 
Autocad. The map, 
coupled with an analysis of 
Figure 18. Mapping of Artifact Locations the recovered artifacts,
served as the main tools used in the examination of the Wilson’s Wharf site. The
maintain not only the 
horizontal but also the vertical
then transferred into an 
Excel file that allowed the 
data to be manipulated by
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map showed all recovered artifact types, distributions and densities reflecting troop 
movements and utilization of the natural landscape.
Laboratory Methods
All recovered artifacts were returned to the WMCAR laboratory for washing, 
identification, numbering and cataloging. The inventory was assembled using a 
standard descriptive typology for historic artifacts (see Harwood 2001). All artifacts 
were prepared for curation according to the standards set by the Virginia Department 
of Historic Resources (DHR).
All Civil War-related artifacts were identified by the author using 
identification guides such as Coates and Thomas 1990, Lords 1995, McAulay 1991, 
McAulay 1987, Melton and Pawl 1996, Tice 1997, Thomas 1997, Thomas and 
Thomas 1996.
A rtifact A n alysis
A total of 265 metal artifacts were collected during the metal detector survey, 
of which 205 could be identified as relating to the Civil War battle and occupation of 
the fortification (Table 3).
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Table 3
Battle-related artifact types and percentages
Fired Dropped Total
Bullets
Union
Minie 44(21.5%) 34(16.5%) 78 (38%)
Williams cleaner 8(4%) 7(3%) 15(7%)
Subtotal 93 (45%)
Confederate
Gardner 2 (1%) 2(1%)
Sharps 10(5%) 5(2%) 15(7%)
Starr 2(1%) 2(1%) 4(2%)
Enfield 2(1%) 1 (.5%) 3(1.5%)
Colt revolving rifle 1 (.5%) 1 (.5%)
Unident, carbine 2(1%) 2(1%)
Subtotal 27 (13%)
Misc. Ammo
Musket ball 2(1 %) 2 (1 %)
Pistol 12(6%) 2(1%) 14(7%)
Shot 30(15%)
Unidentifiable 11 (5%)
Modified 6 (3%)
Subtotal 63 (31%)
Total Bullets 183 (89%)
Misc. Artifacts 
Weaponry
Sword tip fragment 1 (.5%)
Uniform Insignia
Possible “X” 1 (.5%)
Buttons 11 (5.5%)
Hardware
Finial 3 (1.5%)
Grommet 2 (1%)
Artillery
Projectile fragments 4 (2%)
Total Misc. Artifacts 22 (11%)
Total Battle-Related Artifacts 205
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Figure 19. Representative bullets and firearm artifacts (a - .69 caliber roundball 
[MD32]; b - .69 caliber roundball [MD220]; c - .577 caliber Enfield with plug 
[MD77]; d - .58 caliber Minie [MD60]; e - .56 caliber Gardner [MD178]; f  - .58 
caliber Williams Cleaner Type II [MD227]; g - .58 caliber Williams cleaner Type III 
[MD86]; h - .56 caliber Starr [MD46]; i - .56 caliber Colt revolving rifle [MD78]; j - 
.56 caliber Sharps ringtail pattern [MD223]; k - .52 caliber Sharps [MD26]; 1 - .45 
caliber pistol [Watervliet Arsenal] [MD122]; m - .44 caliber Colt [MD181]; n - .45 
caliber roundball [MD121]; o - .31 caliber shot [MD96]; p -  modified bullet, whittled 
[MD52]; q -  modified bullet, ring [MD219].
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Ammunition
.69 caliber roundball (n=2)
The .69 caliber roundball was the most fundamental projectile employed by 
the Union and Confederate armies during the Civil War (Figure 19a-b). The ball was 
used in the older smoothbore weapons, such as the Model 1842 Musket, the 
Remington conversion of the Model 1816 Musket, and some foreign models. The .69 
caliber roundball saw much action during the first two years of the war, as many 
soldiers could not be issued a rifled weapon due to government inventory shortage.
As the war progressed, the production of the rifled musket improved and the less 
accurate smoothbore muskets slowly became obsolete, causing the .69 caliber 
roundball to fall into disuse.
Three .31 caliber buckshot were added to the .69 caliber roundball to form a 
buck and ball cartridge. The purpose of the buckshot was to increase the chances of 
hitting a target when fired from the highly inaccurate smoothbore musket. The 
American military use of buck and ball round dates to the Revolutionary War, with 
the buck and ball becoming the standard musket cartridge during the War of 1812. 
The buck and ball was utilized during the Civil War but gradually fell into disuse 
with the replacement of smoothbores by rifled muskets.
The .69 caliber roundball was also employed as shot within an artillery 
projectile. The internal cavity of the shell was filled with the lead balls in a sulphur 
or pitch matrix. A small bursting charge of black powder was designed to disperse 
the balls in a cone-shaped pattern (Melton and Prawl 1996).
89
The multiple uses for the .69 caliber roundball creates a difficulty in 
determining how the ball was employed during the action at Wilson’s Wharf. Even 
though most smoothbores would have been phased out by the May 24, 1864 
engagement, many Confederate soldiers were issued outdated firearms. Although the 
smoothbore musket was an awkward firearm for use on horseback, the dismounted 
Confederate attack at the Battle of Wilson’s Wharf may have required the use of 
longarm weapons that allowed the troopers to fire on the fort from a greater distance. 
Another possible explanation is that the .69 caliber roundballs were part of the matrix 
of an artillery projectile. The balls may be associated with a Union artillery shell 
fired at the advancing Confederates given the recovery of the two balls well away 
from the fortification.
.577 caliber Enfield (n = 3, 2 fired, 1 dropped)
Ammunition of this type was intended for the British pattern 1853 Enfield 
rifle musket (Figure 19c). The pattern ’53 was the standard firearm of the British 
Army from 1853 to 1867 (Coates and Thomas 1990). Originally produced for British 
service at the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield, England, the rifle was imported 
in large quantities by both the North and South. The recovered Enfield pattern bullets 
are associated with the Confederates since the Northern army did not use ammunition 
of this type (Thomas and Thomas 1996). The Federals issued standard .58 caliber 
rounds while the Confederacy purchased the British-made ammunition or cast them 
in imported molds.
One of the recovered Enfield bullets (MD 77) still contains the clay expansion 
plug within the basal cavity. Upon firing the bullet, the force of the explosion would
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drive the plug up into a hollow in the base causing the bullet to expand into the 
rifling. The British-made Enfield employed a clay or wooden plug as opposed to the 
iron cup found in certain Minie balls due to the tendency of the iron cup to drive 
through the bullet (Coggins 1962).
.58 caliber Minie (n = 78, 44fired, 34 dropped)
The .58 caliber Minie represented the greatest number of Civil War artifacts 
recovered during the investigation (Figure 19d). The basic infantry weapon of the 
Civil War was the .58 caliber rifled musket. The Minie was cylindrical-sided bullet 
with a conical nose. In early designs, a hollow in the base of the ball was fitted with a 
small iron cup. The force of the explosion was supposed to drive the cup up into the 
hollow, forcing the bullet tight into the rifling. However, a serious drawback 
developed as the cup tended to drive through the bullet. The British solved this 
problem by substituting a clay or wooden plug in the Enfield bullet, while the 
American version of the Minie did away with both the cup and plug and relied on a 
hollow base bullet for expansion (Coggins 1962)
The two types of firearms issued to the U.S.C.T. troops at Wilson’s Wharf 
were the regulation U.S. M l 855/61 Springfield, caliber .58, and commercial copies of 
the British M l853 Enfield, caliber .577. The standard U.S. bullet was a refinement of 
the French “Minie” ball that was used by the Union army in both the Federal-issued 
Springfield and Enfield. Therefore the recovered Minie balls are attributed to the 
Union garrison, as the ammunition was the standard issue for the rifled musket of the 
infantry. It is possible that some of the Minie balls represent captured Federal
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supplies employed by the Confederates as at least one regiment (2nd North Carolina 
Cavalry) was issued .577 caliber Enfields.
.58 caliber Gardner (n = 2 fired)
Frederick Gardner received Confederate patent #12 dated August 17, 1861 for 
his bullet and cartridge-making machine (Thomas and Thomas 1996). The Gardner 
was unique because of how the paper cartridge was attached to the bullet (Figure 
19e). Normally the paper was either wrapped or tied around the body but in the 
Gardner the paper was inserted into a groove in the base of the bullet. The majority 
of Gardner bullets were manufactured at the Richmond Laboratory. As the two 
recovered bullets were produced in the South, they were associated with the 
Confederate participants at the Battle of Wilson’s Wharf.
.58 caliber Williams Cleaner (n = 15, 8fired, 7 dropped)
The Williams Cleaner bullet was intended for use in various .58 caliber 
firearms (Figure 19f). The recovered Williams bullets are associated with the Union- 
issued Springfield or Enfield rifled muskets, as this type of ammunition was included 
within every bundle of ten .58 caliber cartridges. By April 1863, three out of every 
ten cartridges were Williams Cleaners, which was standard until August 1864 when 
the number was increased to six out of ten (Thomas 1997). The Williams cleaner was 
manufactured by Elijah D. Williams whose 1862 patent called for the used of zinc 
washers and a pin of plunder as a means for the bullet to take the rifling of the musket 
(Thomas and Thomas 1996). In operation, the powder gases directly or indirectly 
flattened the washers causing them to expand into the rifling. The flattened washers 
also scraped away the fouling bore as the bullet excited from the gun (Thomas and
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Thomas 1996). The recovered Williams cleaners included both the Type II and Type 
III bullet. The type II cleaner is distinguished by having three rings while the Type 
III displays two rings. The Type II was patented in late 1862, and the Type III in 
early 1863 (Thomas 1997).
.54 caliber Starr (n=4, 2 fired, 2 dropped)
During the Civil War over 20,000 Starr carbines were purchased by the Union 
army, however, the firearm was not well-liked given its light and overly complicated 
mechanism (Coates and Thomas 1990) (Figure 19h). Carbines were well suited to 
cavalry operations as they were shorter and less awkward than rifles. The breech- 
loading mechanism of the Starr allowed for a higher rate and more convenient 
method of fire for the mounted soldier. Given the intended use of the carbine as a 
cavalry firearm, coupled with the fact that no Starrs were issued to the Union infantry, 
indicates the weapon was associated with a Confederate soldier. It is likely the Starr 
was a captured carbine put to use during the attack on Wilson’s Wharf.
.56 caliber Colt Revolving Rifle (n=l dropped)
One possible bullet for a Colt Revolving Rifle was recovered during the 
investigation (Figure 19i). The rifle was first produced in 1855 and was submitted to 
the U.S. Army for field tests in 1857 (Coates and Thomas 1990). The weapon was 
designed and produced by Colt Firearms Manufacturing Company as an enlarged 
version of the famous Colt revolver. Despite the purchase of 4600 Colt rifles by the 
Federal government, the firearm was considered too complex for military use (Coates 
and Thomas 1990).
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As no Colt Revolving Rifles were issued to the Union troops stationed at 
Wilson’s Wharf, the bullet may indicate that a Confederate soldier employed a 
captured weapon of this type.
.52 caliber Sharps (n=l5, 10fired, 5 dropped)
This typed of ammunition could be used in either the Sharps rifle or carbine 
(Figure 19j-k). Both firearms were breech-loading, allowing the soldier to fire with 
much greater ease than the standard muzzle-loading rifle. The Sharps carbine and the 
Sharps rifle were mechanically identical and each used a paper or linen cartridge 
(Coates and Thomas 1990). The Federal government purchased over 80,000 Sharps 
carbines and approximately 10,000 Sharps rifles during the Civil War. Both Union 
and Confederate cavalrymen tended to favor the Sharps carbine over other more 
advanced firearms given the simplicity and reliability of the weapon. The Sharps 
ammunition recovered from the battle site is associated with the Confederate force as 
no Sharps firearms were issued to the U.S.C.T. stationed at Wilson’ Wharf. The 
bullets indicate the presence of captured Federal carbines, or Southern produced 
copies, in the battle. The latter is most likely the case as the South issued Confederate 
Sharps carbines to three regiments who participated in the May 24, 1864 engagement. 
These were the 2nd North Carolina and 1st and 6th Virginia (Coates and Thomas 1990). 
The simple mechanism of the Sharps carbine allowed the weapon to be copied and 
manufactured first by S.C. Robinson Co. of Richmond, Virginia, and later by the 
Confederate government. The South produced some 5000 Confederate Sharps 
carbines that, while nearly identical in appearance to their Northern counterparts,
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were prone to malfunctions due to the poor quality of manufacture (Coates and 
Thomas 1990).
.44 caliber (n=14, 12 fired 2 dropped)
This type of ammunition was intended for the Colt “Army” revolvers. The 
first type of recovered .44 caliber pistol bullet represents ammunition produced by the 
Watervliet, New York Arsenal (Figure 191). The second and third type represents a 
.44 caliber Colt pistol bullet (Figure 19m) and a .44 caliber roundball (Figure 19n) of 
unknown manufacture. Colt revolvers were the most famous and widely used 
handguns in the Civil War. All Colt pistols were six-shot, single action, percussion 
revolvers (Coates and Thomas 1990). The prominence of the Colt revolver in the 
pre-war meant many soldiers went to war with the popular firearm. Most of the 
Federal purchases of Colt revolvers went to arm Union cavalrymen (Coates and 
Thomas 1990).
Confederate imitations of the Colt revolver totaled less than 7000 arms with 
most of the copies representing the .44 caliber Colt “Dragoon” first produced in the 
1850s (Coats and Thomas 1990). The .44 caliber bullets may represent the handguns 
of the attacking Confederate cavalry as the 1st and 15th Virginia regiments were issued 
both Colt Army and Navy revolvers (Coats and Thomas 1990). However, as many 
Union officers carried the popular handgun, it is possible the ammunition may be 
associated with the personal side arms discharged during the engagement by the 
Union pickets patrolling the site perimeter.
.31 caliber (n—30)
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This type of ball was typically associated with buckshot (Figure 19o). 
Buckshot rounds consisted of multiple small caliber balls encased in a single cartridge 
for use in a shotgun. Three .31 caliber balls were also combined with a .69 caliber 
ball to create the “buck and ball” round. The purpose of the buck and ball was to 
increase the chance of hitting a target when fired from the highly inaccurate 
smoothbore musket (Thomas and Thomas 1996).
The fact that Union soldiers at Wilson’s Wharf were not armed with 
smoothbores indicates that the .31 caliber shot is associated with Confederate 
weaponry. Although smoothbore muskets were outdated by 1864, it is possible that 
some poorly armed Confederate troopers used the longarm with buck and ball rounds 
during their dismounted attack on the fort.
Another probable explanation for the .31 caliber shot is that the ammunition is 
associated with the shotgun. The shotgun had limited value as an infantry weapon 
due to its short effective range. It was in the close, sometimes hand to hand fighting 
common to mounted troops that the shotgun found its greatest use. As the double- 
barreled weapon existed in abundance in the ante-bellum South, the shotgun was 
quickly incorporated into the ranks of the Confederate cavalry. With its barrels 
shortened for ease in carrying on horseback, the resulting spray of buckshot made the 
shotgun a formidable weapon in close combat. The recovered .31 caliber bullets may 
be associated with the shotguns employed by the Confederate cavalry during the 
initial mounted attack on Union pickets.
Modified Bullets (n=6)
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Several modified bullets were recovered during the investigation. Each 
represents the post-battle activities of the Union soldiers stationed at Wilson’s Wharf, 
by that time known at Fort Pocahontas. Much of garrison life was monotonous and 
soldiers often whittled the soft lead bullets during idle time (Figure 19p). One 
recovered bullet was carved into a flat ring while two others were simply the tips of 
the bullets that had been removed (Figure 19q).
Unidentified bullets (n—11)
Eleven fired bullets were recovered which were disfigured to the point that 
they could not be positively identified or 
associated with either Union or 
Confederate troops.
Artillery 
Shrapnel (n=4)
Four shrapnel fragments were recovered 
during the project. Three of the 
fragments were too small to be 
associated with a specific projectile type.
The fourth fragment (MD 27) is from the nose end of a Federal Read-Parrott 
projectile intended for a 10-pounder Parrott rifle of 2.9-inch caliber (Melton and Pawl
1996) (Figure 20). The fragment contains a section of the fuse hole where the 
percussion fuse was screwed into place by the use of a spanner wrench. The screw 
threat grooves for the percussion fuse are still visible on the artifact. The projectile 
fragment is associated with the Union garrison and Wild’s Battery M, 3rd New York
Figure 20. Parrott fragment (MD27)
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Light Artillery manned two 10-rifled Parrott guns which were employed against the
Confederate force at the battle of Wilson’s Wharf
Weaponry
Sword Fragment (n=J)
The specimen (MD 13) represents the tip end of straight backsword (Figure 
21). The saber has a straight, rather than curved bladed and is single rather than 
double-edged. The artifact measures 7 and 5/16” in length, 1 and 7/16” in width, and 
5/16” in thickness.
Figure 21. Straight backsword fragment (MD13)
In the Civil War, the sword served both as weapon and symbol of rank. 
Before the war, many mounted soldiers considered the saber their principal weapon. 
As cavalry charges were seldom practical in the overgrown terrain of the eastern 
United States, Civil War cavalrymen cam to rely on pistols and carbines. 
Artillerymen and infantry officers were issued swords but they also preferred the
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revolver for close combat fighting. Staff officers and generals carried swords mainly 
as a badge of office.
Among the enlisted men in the Union Army, only cavalrymen, sergeants, 
some artillerymen, and musicians were issued swords. Nearly all Federal regulation 
swords were patterned after weapons of the French Army. Most Confederate sabers 
were variations on U.S. Army models and were manufactured in the South. The 
recovered sword fragment is attributed to a Confederate cavalry participant in the 
Battle of Wilson’s Wharf as mounted soldiers carried most straight backswords. The 
specimen is not associated with the Union infantry as most foot officers were 
typically issued straight, double-edged swords.
Buttons
Unidentified Buttons (n-4)
Four buttons were recovered during the survey too corroded for identification. 
The first specimen (MD 210) is a ferrous fastener 11/16” in diameter (Figure 22a). 
The second artifact (MD 87) is the face fragment of a copper-alloy button 13/16” in 
diameter (Figure 22b). The third specimen (MD 222) is a face and back fragment of 
a copper-alloy fastener 11/16” in diameter (Figure 22d). The fourth artifact (MD 
123) is the face and back fragments of a copper-alloy button V*” in diameter (Figure 
22e).
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Figure 22. Buttons (a - unidentified button [MD210]; b -  unidentified button 
[MD87]; c -  Union “Waterbury” button [MD85]; d -  unidentified button [MD222]; e 
-  unidentified button [MD123]; f  -  Confederate artillery button [MD76]; g -  Navy 
button [upside-down] [MD173]; h -  civilian button [MD62]; i -  civilian button 
[MD216]).
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“Waterbury ” Button (n=l)
The specimen (MD 85) represents the back of a copper-alloy button Va ’ in 
diameter with the Waterbury Button Company backmark (Figure 22c). In 1849, the 
Benedict and Burnham Manufacturing Company of Waterbury, Connecticut spun off 
the button department to form the “Waterbury Button Company” (Tice 1997). The 
company manufactured vegetable ivory, composition, cloth-covered, and brass 
buttons. During the Civil War, the firm became one of the foremost button suppliers 
to Federal forces. Of all the nineteenth-century companies making military buttons, 
the Waterbury Button Company is the only one surviving to modem times (Tice
1997).
The “Waterbury” button may be associated with the Union occupants of the 
garrison as the company was a Northern firm. However, a Confederate soldier may 
have lost the button as Southern forces supplied much of their troops with captured 
Federal equipment (Coggins 1962:25).
Confederate “A ” Artillery Button (n=l)
The specimen is a gilded, convex, copper-alloy button 7/8” in diameter as 
shown in Tice (1997:221) (Figure 22f). The button was one of eight Confederate 
dress regulation patterns with the large raised letter “A” denoting a member of the 
artillery. The size of the button (7/8”) indicates the fastener was intended for the 
blouse or overcoat of a Confederate officer of the artillery (Tice 1997:197). The 
button may be attributed to a Confederate gunner present at the engagement under the 
command of Lieutenant Marcellus Moorman. The artifact may also represent
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evidence of reuse by the mounted Southern soldiers as uniforms and supplies were in 
ever increasingly short supply by the end of the war.
Lacking the industrial infrastructure of the North, Confederates depended 
upon small, poorly tooled shops and even home industries to supply military goods. 
The South imported much of their war materiel from Europe, however the effort was 
frustrated by an effective Federal naval blockade. As the war progressed and the 
southern economy became more and more exhausted, undecorated buttons of wood, 
cloth-covered wood, and bone were all the Confederates could produce for enlisted 
men. Officer’s buttons, such as the recovered artifact, continued to follow the 
prescribed regulation design and were produced throughout the war. A Confederate 
cavalryman may have previously salvaged the single button or an entire article of 
clothing only to lose the fastener during the engagement.
Navy Button (n=l)
One small Navy cuff button was recovered during the survey (Figure 22g). 
The copper-alloy fastener is Vz” in diameter and displays an upright anchor design on 
the front. The fastener contains no backmark. Although the precise design could not 
be identified at present, a similar upright anchor design was located in Tice 
(1997:160). However, the device contains a rope intertwined around the anchor 
whereas the recovered button lacks this feature. Tice notes the upright anchor device 
was used on the earliest United States Navy buttons for junior officers. Chief Petty 
Officers began using similar buttons around 1840. During the early 1850’s, the Navy 
issued a design with an eagle standing on the shank of a horizontal rather than an 
upright anchor. In 1852, the Navy decreed that the horizontal anchor buttons were to
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be worn by all personnel. The recovered button was most likely manufactured 
sometime after 1840.
As the origin of the design could not be identified, the button could not be 
directly attributed to either the Union or Confederate participants. As it is unique for 
a naval button to be recovered from the site of an engagement between infantry and 
cavalry forces, it is possible a Confederate soldier reused the fastener.
Civilian Buttons (n—2)
Two flat, one-piece buttons were recovered that are associated with pre-Civil 
War occupation of the site. The first specimen (MD 62) is a copper alloy fastener 1” 
in diameter (Figure 22h). The second specimen (MD 216) is a copper alloy fastener 
13/16” in diameter (Figure 22i).
Miscellaneous Artifacts 
“X ” Emblem (n=l)
This artifacts is a copper alloy “X” measuring 11/16” x 11/16” (Figure 23a). 
While the precise function of the artifact is as yet undetermined, it appears similar to 
the “X” emblem of Major General Horatio Wrights VI Corps of the Union Army of 
the Potomac. Brigadier General Joseph Hooker prescribed corps and division 
insignia in 1863 to boost his army’s flagging spirits and provide a means by which 
commanders could identify their units in the field. The first corps badges were 
distinctive shapes cut from colored cloth. In time, more elaborate badges appeared 
from materials ranging from bone to solid gold. If the copper alloy “X” is a corps 
emblem, it remains a mystery as to how the artifact found its way to the site since 
Wright’s VI Corps was stationed outside of Richmond near Cold Harbor around the
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time of the action at Wilson’s Wharf. The troops involved in the engagement, the 1st 
and 10th U.S.C.T, were attached to Major General William Smith’s XVIII Corps of 
the Army of the James. The emblem may have been associated with a VI Corps 
soldier who passed through Fort Pocahontas as the garrison served as a 
communications and supply outpost for the campaign against Petersburg and 
Richmond.
Figure 23. Miscellaneous artifacts (a -  “X” [MD19]; b -  finial [MD31]; c -  rivet 
[MD97; d -  grommet [MD23]; e -  thimble [MD90]; f-h -  buckles [MD93, 41, 43]; i -  
copper-alloy sleeve [MD39]; j -  modem percussion cap [MD110]; k -  modem “I” 
uniform emblem [MD239]).
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Finial (n=3)
The recovered finials appear to belong to cartridge boxes issued to soldiers 
during the Civil War (Figure 23b). The finials have not been associated with either 
the Union or Confederate participants at the action of Wilson’s Wharf.
Rivet (n=5)
The rivets appear to be similar to the harness rivet/burrs recovered at the 
Camp Lewis Civil War site in New Mexico (Haecker 1998:33c) (Figure 23c). 
Haecker states that the large size of the rivets, relative to what was found on military 
accouterments, suggest the artifacts were used on horse tack, such as traces. Given 
the possibly that the rivets were associated with the civilian residents of the site area 
and not the Civil War military occupants, the specimens were not included with the 
Civil War artifacts recovered from the battlefield survey.
Grommet (n=2)
The grommets are a half-inch in diameter and are the same as those found at 
the Civil War sites of Folly Island, South Carolina and Camp Lewis, New Mexico 
(Legg and Smith 1989, Haecker 1998) (Figure 23d). The grommets are associated 
with a Civil War-era rubber poncho employed by Union soldiers stationed at 
Wilson’s Wharf/Fort Pocahontas.
Thimble (n=l)
One small copper alloy thimble was recovered during the survey (Figure 23e). 
The thimble may have been part of a sewing kit carried by a Union Soldier stationed 
at the fort.
Buckles (n=3)
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The three small buckles appear to be associated with horse-related equipment. 
Buckle 1 (MD93) is a ferrous buckle 2 lA in. in diameter with a tongue (Figure 23f). 
Buckle 2 (MD41) is a small rectangular ferrous buckle 15/16 in. by 7/8 in. with a 
tongue (Figure 23h). None of the buckles could be specifically associated with the 
military occupation of the site and were not included in the Civil War artifact totals. 
Copper Alloy Sleeve/Hardware (n=l)
The small copper alloy sleeve-like cylinder measures 15/16 in. in height and 1 
lA in. in diameter (Figure 23i). The function of the artifact could not be determined 
and therefore the cylinder was not included in the Civil War artifact totals.
Modern Percussion Cap (n=27)
A total of 27 modem percussion caps were recovered from the western most 
finger of Lee’s Ravine (Area 3) (Figure 23j). As modem percussion caps are 
essentially the same as those used during the Civil War, the age of the artifacts is 
based on their lack of corrosion. Most still contain a shiny brass finish and had not 
developed a green corrosion layer on their surface. The percussion caps were 
associated with the activities of Civil War re-enactors who have recreated the battle 
of Wilson’s Wharf in recent years. The re-enactors appear to have been discharging 
their weapons within a certain portion of the ravine. The modem percussion caps 
were not included in the Civil War artifact totals.
Modern Pistol Percussion Cap (n—1)
One modem pistol percussion cap (MD177) was also recovered within Lee’s 
Ravine. As with the other recovered percussion caps, the artifact appears to be
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associated with the activities of Civil War re-enactors due to their lack of surface 
corrosion. The modem percussion cap was not included in the artifact totals.
Modern “I ” Company Uniform Emblem (n=l)
One modem “I” Company uniform emblem was recovered within Lee’s 
Ravine (Figure 23k). The emblem was determined to be modem based on its method 
of constmction. It is associated with the activities of Civil War re-enactors. The 
modem emblem was not included in the Civil War artifact total.
Distribution of Civil War Artifacts Within Study Areas
The investigation of the Wilson’s Wharf battlefield necessitated the division 
of the site into discrete elements, as a 100% survey of the property was not feasible. 
Each study area was chosen arbitrarily by the project archaeologist and served as a 
method of control during the survey. The study areas, while artificial, facilitated the 
sampling of the archaeological evidence of the battle within definable sections. The 
distribution of individual artifacts within each study area was then analyzed in order 
to identify specific battle positions. The identification of discrete positions then 
contributed to an overall interpretation of battle-related events. The following section 
provides a description of the distribution of Civil War artifacts recovered within each 
study area. Only Study Areas 1 -  6, 9, 10, 12, and 13 produced evidence relating to 
the May 24, 1864 engagement or Union occupation of the fortification. No artifacts 
were recovered within Study Areas 7 and 8. Study Area 11 was not investigated 
during the 2000 ABPP survey as it was previously examined by the WMCAR in 
1997. All recovered artifacts are listed in the inventory appendix according to their 
respective specimen number and study area location.
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Figure 24. Equipment and Hardware Distribution Within Site Examination
Areas
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Figure 25. Ammunition Distribution Within Site Examination Areas
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Area 1 (n = 52)
Area 1 was investigated for evidence of the frontal diversionary attack on the 
garrison employed by the Confederates. Out of the total of fifty-two recovered 
artifacts, forty-seven were attributed to the battle. The remaining five artifacts were 
of unknown function or did not relate to the engagement.
A total of thirty-eight bullets were identified, representing a variety of 
ammunition types. The largest number of specimens consisted of fourteen dropped 
and two fired .58 caliber Minie balls. The majority of the Minie balls were recovered 
within a 250 ft. length of Transect 1. The second greatest number of recovered 
specimens consisted of .31 caliber shot possibly associated with the shotguns of the 
Confederate cavalry. A total of four .52 caliber Sharps and four unidentifiable bullets 
were collected. One Williams Cleaner (Type III) and one Enfield bullet was found 
within Area 1.
A variety of other Civil War-era artifacts were recovered within Area 1 
including: the possible “X” insignia, the Confederate cavalry backsword tip, a 
fragment of a 10-pounder Parrott shell, a .69 caliber roundball (possibly shot for an 
artillery projectile), a copper-alloy button, two poncho grommets, and two finials. 
Area 2 (n = 10)
Area 2 was investigated for evidence of the diversionary frontal assault 
carried out by the dismounted Confederate soldiers. Out of the ten recovered 
artifacts, nine were attributed to the engagement while the last specimen was a .22 
caliber bullet not associated with the battle.
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A total of six bullets were recovered within Area 2 consisting of: two fired 
Minie balls, one Enfield bullet with its clay plug, one .56 caliber bullet for a Colt 
Revolving Rifle, one Williams Cleaner, and one .31 shot. Also identified were two 
small shrapnel fragments from an artillery shell and a Confederate “A” artillery 
button.
Area 3 — Lee’s Ravine (n = 129)
Area 3 was investigated to determine if the ravine was the “circuitous and 
wooded” route employed by the Confederates in staging their main attack on the fort. 
Area 3 produced the greatest number of artifacts and appeared to have been the 
location of heavy fighting during the engagement. Out of the one hundred twenty-six 
recovered artifacts, ninety-six were attributed to the engagement while thirty-three 
specimens proved to be modem or unidentifiable. The non-Civil War artifacts 
consisted of 27 modem percussion caps and an “I” Company insignia associated with 
re-enactors and five miscellaneous artifacts.
A total of ninety bullets were recovered within Lee’s Ravine with the majority 
represented by Minie balls (34 fired, 4 dropped). The remainder of the recovered 
bullets are as follows: seventeen specimens of .31 caliber shot, eleven .44 caliber 
pistol bullets, nine Williams Cleaners (6 fired, 3 dropped), six unidentifiable bullets, 
four .52 caliber Sharps, two .54 caliber Starr, two .58 caliber Gardner, and one 
Enfield.
Also recovered were two buttons including a small Navy button with an 
upright anchor, three rivets, and a buckle.
Area 4 — Powerline Cut (n =  16)
I l l
Area 4 was examined to determine the western extent of the battle-related 
evidence. Only eight of the sixteen artifacts collected in Area 4 were attributed to the 
engagement. A total of five bullets were recovered consisting of three Minie balls (2 
fired, 1 dropped) and two dropped .54 caliber Starr. Also two miscellaneous buckles 
and a small fragment of shrapnel were identified.
Area 5 -  Large Circular Rise (n =  24)
All artifacts recovered from Area 5 represent a sample from a small section of 
the study area that was investigated. The sample section is situated above a cut 
leading down into Lee’s Ravine (Area 3) and was examined as one possible route for 
the main charge of Wickham’s Confederates. A total of twenty-two of the twenty- 
four recovered artifacts were attributed to the engagement. The specimens consist of: 
ten dropped Minie balls, four dropped .56 caliber Sharps, three Williams Cleaners, 
two unidentifiable bullets, one dropped and one fired .44 caliber pistol bullet, and one 
copper-alloy rivet.
Area 6 -  Ravine Finger 1 (n = 10)
Area 6 is a drainage cut for Lee’s Ravine located on the eastern side of the 
fortification. The ravine finger was investigated for evidence of Wickham’s main 
charge on the Union garrison. A total of eight of the ten artifacts recovered in Area 6 
were attributed to the engagement. The two non-Civil War specimens represent late 
nineteenth century coins. The Civil War artifacts are two dropped and two fired 
Minie balls, two .52 caliber Sharps, one dropped .44 caliber pistol ball, and one 
ferrous button.
Area 9 -  Cemetery Knoll (n =  4)
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The survey of the Cemetery Knoll was hindered due to the recent use of the 
locale to dump and bum trash. The abundance of metal artifacts, such as wire and 
nails, forced the archaeologists to discriminate out all ferrous materials during the 
investigation of the knoll. A total of three of the four artifacts recovered in Area 9 
were attributed to the Civil War occupation of the site. One dropped Minie ball, one 
unidentifiable bullet, and a lead bullet carved into a ring were associated with the 
Union garrison. A civilian button dating to the colonial or antebellum occupation of 
the site was also collected as the knoll contains eighteenth century archaeological 
features.
Area 10 — Eastern Cleared Area (n = 4)
A Union encampment area was located in Area 10 during the 1997 field 
season. The 2000 survey investigated the eastern one-third of Area 10 that was not 
investigated in 1997 due to heavy vegetation. All four artifacts collected in the 
Eastern Cleared Area were attributed to the engagement. The specimens represent 
one dropped Minie ball, one .69 caliber roundball, one unidentifiable bullet, and one 
copper-alloy button.
Area 12 - Parking Lot (n = 6)
The investigation of the grassy portion of the parking lot revealed six artifacts 
associated with the Civil War occupation of the site. Two Minie balls (1 fired, 1 
dropped) and a Williams Cleaner represent the bullets recovered in Area 12. Also 
recovered were two copper-alloy buttons and a small thimble.
Area 13 - Western Shoreline (n =  9)
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Area 13 was investigated to determine if the bluff represented “the small piece 
of woods to the west of the fortification” used by Dunovant’s Confederates to raise 
havoc on passing transports and the Union signal station. Only two of the nine 
artifacts collected from Area 13 were attributed to the Civil War occupation of the 
site representing a fired Minie and a whittled bullet.
CHAPTER VI.
AN HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
THE BATTLE OF WILSON’S WHARF 
Interpreting the Evidence
This chapter combines historical evidence with the archaeological data 
recovered from the 2000 ABPP survey to formulate an interpretation of the events of 
the May 24, 1864 Battle of Wilson’s W harf Scott (1998) describes the interpretation 
of battlefield archaeology as analogous to reading a crime scene. The historical 
documentation becomes the eyewitness testimony and the archaeological data 
represents the physical remains of the event. The researcher then integrates the two 
types of evidence in order to solve the mystery of how the actions of the engagement 
unfolded. Yet, it must be recognized that any interpretation of a battle is subject to 
various biases. The Battle of Wilson’s Wharf is only moderately well documented in 
the Civil War records and remembrances of the Civil War participants are limited due 
to the small scale of the action. Most official reports and recollections generally 
agree on the sequence of events during the engagement, however most accounts fail 
to detail the specific location of the soldiers on the landscape. The archaeological 
evidence fills in the gaps in the story left blank by the historical record.
Just as the historical evidence contains biases, it must be noted that the 
archaeological record also displays shortcomings. Uncontrolled relic hunting by local 
“hunt clubs’’ over the years may have reduced the total artifact quantity and has 
undoubtedly disrupted the artifact distribution patterns. Another bias taken into
114
115
consideration is that the battle was not the only cultural event at the fortification. The 
site was occupied beginning in the seventeenth century and continues to be in use.
The May 24, 1864 engagement was not the only Civil War activity on the site as 
Union troops began building the earthworks in early May 1864 and garrisoned Fort 
Pocahontas until the end of the war. The area contains a rich archaeological record of 
which the battle remains are only a small part, but the pre- and post-battle activities 
were generally easily recognizable by datable artifact types. Recovered artifacts not 
associated with the occupation of the fort or battle were left in situ.
The interpretations offered here are based on the analysis of the patterning of 
the archaeological evidence within the battlefield landscape combined with the 
available historical documentation of the engagement. The artifacts are the material 
culture remains of past activities. Information about the nature of those activities is 
available not only through individual artifacts but also in the spatial relationships 
between artifacts (Scott 1998). An examination of the artifactual relationships within 
the context of the cultural landscape allows behavioral patterns to be defined and 
measured. It is from the analysis of behavioral patterning within the battlefield 
landscape that statements can be made concerning the behavioral processes that 
shaped a battle event. The documentary record provides the historic context into 
which the behavioral processes of the Battle of Wilson’s Wharf can be placed, 
thereby providing a more complete picture of the actions of May 24, 1864.
The following discussion will present a synthesis of the behavioral processes 
that shaped the Battle of Wilson’s Wharf. An examination of the spatial distribution 
of recovered clothing, equipment, and firearm related artifacts within the context of
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the May 24, 1864 battlefield landscape allows for the identification of behavioral 
patterning that can be attributed to either the Union and Confederate participants. In 
the case of firearm related evidence, the patterning of bullets and projectile fragments 
can indicate combat activity on the individual or unit level. The firearm evidence can 
be compared with official records listing weapon types issued to various groups in 
order to attribute identity to the individual or unit patterns defined within the 
battlefield landscape.
Evidence o f  Clothing and Equipment
The number of artifacts representing clothing and equipment used by the 
combatants is relatively few. This is not unexpected given the small scale of the 
engagement. Also, the survey sampled the total area of the battlefield and therefore 
the number of recovered clothing and equipment artifacts represents only a sample of 
what may be present in the archaeological record.
Clothing
By the last years of the Civil War clothing was in short supply for the 
Confederate army while the Union troops were relatively well clothed and 
accoutered. Much of what the Confederates wore and carried was captured from the 
Federal army (Coggins 1962:25). Archaeological evidence for clothing consists of 
seven buttons.
An “A” button was originally associated with a Confederate artillery officer’s 
blouse or overcoat. The fastener may indicate the presence of an officer attached to 
Lt. Moorman’s gun as this design was produced throughout the war. Another 
plausible explanation may be that a Confederate cavalry soldier salvaged the button,
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or even an entire blouse or overcoat, as clothing, especially overcoats, was in short 
supply in the South by the time of the battle.
A “Waterbury” button and the unidentifiable buttons may be associated with 
the Union occupants of the garrison. The Waterbury Button Company was a 
Northern-manufacturing firm that became one of the foremost suppliers of fasteners 
to the Federal army during the Civil War. However, as the Confederate cavalry was 
infamous for their ability to raid Union supplies, the buttons may be associated with 
use by Confederate soldiers.
The Navy cuff button presented a mystery. How did the artifact find its way to 
Lee’s Ravine (Area 3)? As the precise design could not be identified, the button 
could not be associated with either army. The fastener may indicate further use of 
Federal supplies by Confederate soldiers as no Union infantry soldier would have 
been issued this type of button.
Overall the archaeological clothing specimens provided little insight into the 
details o f the battle. The Confederate “A” button confirmed the presence of the 
Confederate troops at the Battle of Wilson’s Wharf and possibly placed the 
Confederate artillery gun to the north of Lee’s Ravine within Area 2. However, 
further investigation is necessary to confirm this hypothesis. More research is 
required to identify the design of the Navy button. The remaining buttons were 
scattered throughout the survey area and were too corroded to be identified.
Military Equipment
The archaeological evidence for equipment is limited in number. The average 
Civil War soldier was issued a variety of equipment. Beside his weapon, the soldier
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would have carried a belt with a buckle, a cartridge pouch, and a cap pouch. Other 
equipment may have included a canteen, mess gear, and a haversack. While the 
Federal soldier may have been so well equipped, the supply shortages in the South 
often forced the Confederate trooper to rely on salvaged accouterments (Coggins 
1962:25).
One of the most unique equipment specimens is the backsword fragment. The 
sword was associated with a Confederate participant in the battle as cavalry soldiers 
were issued the weapon as part of their equipage. The recovery of the sword tip 
indicates heavy action occurred within Area 1 as a forceful impact would have been 
required to fragment the weapon. The area received Union artillery fire as indicated 
by the recovery of a shell fragment from a 10-pounder Parrott gun, the same type 
employed by Wild’s Battery M, 3rd New York Light Artillery.
Other recovered equipment includes two cartridge box finials, five harness 
rivets, two poncho grommets, a thimble, and three miscellaneous buckles. The 
finials, rivets, and buckles could not be attributed to either the Union or Confederate 
participants. The poncho grommets and thimble are attributed to the Union soldiers 
who garrisoned the fort after the battle.
Firearms at the Battle o f Wilson ys Wharf
Bullets and shell fragments are the most numerous artifacts recovered during 
the survey and are most indicative of battle events. The combination of historical 
documentation and archaeological evidence allows for the determination of the 
firearm and artillery types employed at the Battle of Wilson’s Wharf. An 
examination of documents relating to weapon types issued to the Union and
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Confederate participants provides indirect evidence of possible firearms used at the 
battle. Recovered bullets and shrapnel provide direct evidence of the firearms types 
present at the engagement. The recovered firearm evidence can be compared with 
official records listing weapon types issued to various groups in order to attribute 
identity to the individual or unit patterns. The analysis of Union and Confederate unit 
patterns within the context of the battlefield landscape is the key in determining how 
the actions and movements of the Battle of Wilson’s Wharf unfolded.
Historical Evidence
Although historical documentation is not extensive on the firearm types 
present at the battle, official records note the weapons originally issued to certain 
Union and Confederate participants. All documentation is taken from Record Groups 
94, 109, and 156, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., 
as listed in Coates and Thomas (1990).
Firearm and artillery types are known for the Union participants at the battle. 
In 1863, the 1st U.S.C.T. was originally issued .69 caliber 1842 Smoothbore muskets, 
but were upgraded to .58 caliber Springfield rifled muskets for the 1864 campaign 
against Richmond. The 10th U.S.C.T was issued .577 caliber Enfield rifled muskets 
that could fire the same .58 caliber ammunition as the Springfield. Battery M of the 
3rd New York Light Artillery manned two 10-pounder Parrott guns, while the Union 
gunboat Dawn was armed with a 100-pounder rifle, 20-pounder rifle, and a rifled 12- 
pounder Howitzer.
Firearm types are known for several Confederate regiments present at the 
engagement. Documentation identifies some of the arms issued to the 1st, 6th, and
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15th Virginia Cavalry and the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry. The 1st Virginia Cavalry 
was issued Hall carbines, Merrill carbines, and Colt Army and Navy revolvers. The 
6th Virginia Cavalry was issued Burnside carbines and Hall carbines. The 15th 
Virginia Cavalry was issued Colt Army revolvers. The most detailed records for 
issued firearms are known for the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry. The Tarheel regiment 
was issued the following arms: M l 842 .69 caliber rifled musket, .577 Enfield rifled 
musket, .577 Enfield rifled musket w/ saber bayonet, .54 caliber Austrian rifle 
muskets, Spencer rifles, Burnside carbines, Sharps carbines, and Smith carbines. 
Archaeological Evidence
The archaeological record not only confirms the documentary evidence but 
also provides new insight regarding the firearm types present at the Battle of Wilson’s 
Wharf. The survey identified at least eight different small arms and one artillery gun 
type which are as follows: Springfield rifled musket, Enfield rifled musket, shotgun 
(.31 caliber), Colt Army revolver, Sharps carbine, Starr carbine, Colt revolving rifle, 
.69 caliber musket, and a 10-pounder Parrott rifled-gun. In several cases, only one or 
two specimen types were recovered.
The most common bullet type recovered was the .58 caliber bullet represented 
by the Minie ball (n=77), Williams Cleaner (n=15), Enfield-type (n=3), and Gardner 
(n=2). All ammunition of this type could be fired from both the Springfield Rifled 
Musket and Enfield Rifled Musket. The North issued the .58 caliber Minie ball to be 
used in either firearm. Since the 1st U.S.C.T was armed with Springfields and the 10th 
U.S.C.T. with Enfields it is probable that the recovered Minie balls and Williams 
Cleaners were associated with the Federal troops. However, the historical record
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indicates the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry was issued Enfields at some point during the 
war. It is possible that some of the Minie balls or Williams Cleaners represent 
Confederate positions, given the propensity of the South to supply their troops with 
captured Federal goods. The recovery of three British Enfield bullets and two 
Southern-made Gardner bullets further corroborates the use of .58 caliber rifled 
muskets by the Confederates as only the South issued these ammunition types.
The distribution pattern of the .31 caliber lead shot (n=30) suggests a battle 
association. The shot may be associated with weapons of the Confederate cavalry as 
the ammunition type was clustered amid battle-related artifacts. The majority of the 
shot was recovered within Lee’s Ravine (Area 3), an area the survey identified as the 
scene of intense combat action.
The .44 caliber pistol bullets (n=14) may represent the use of the Colt Army 
revolver by the Confederate cavalrymen. The documentary record indicates both the 
1st and the 15th Virginia Cavalry were issued this type of firearm. The revolver 
ammunition was recovered only within Lee’s Ravine (Area 3) and may indicate the 
presence of the 1st and/or 15th Regiment within this section of the battlefield. The 1st 
Virginia Cavalry was part of Wickham’s Brigade that participated in the main attack 
on the eastern side of the garrison. The 15th Virginia cavalry was attached to 
Lomax’s Brigade under the command of Colonel Dunovant and participated in the 
demonstration on the north and west side o f the fortification. The recovery of the .44 
caliber bullets within Area 3 confirms Wild’s report of the use of the wooded ravine 
by the Confederates to conceal their movements during the engagement (ORUCA 
1891: 270).
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The recovery of Sharps ammunition (n=15) confirms the use of the firearm by 
the Confederates. The sparse historical record identifies that Sharps carbines were 
issued to the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry. The 2nd participated in Wickham’s main 
charge on the Union right. As Sharps bullets were distributed throughout the 
battlefield site and not just to the east of the fortification, it appears that troopers other 
than the 2nd were armed with Sharps. It is possible other Confederate troopers were 
issued Sharps carbines given the popularity of the firearm.
Two weapon types not listed in the documentary evidence were identified in 
the archaeological record. The retrieval of Starr carbine (n=4) and Colt revolving 
rifle (n=l) ammunition confirms Confederate use of captured Federal supplies since 
no Southern troops present at the battle were issued either firearm. The recovery of 
Starr bullets to the north and to the west of the fortification may represent the 
movement of one trooper during Dunovant’s feint on the Union front and left. The 
second possibility is that more than one Confederate participant was armed with a 
Starr carbine during the engagement. The Colt revolving rifle bullet, while 
represented by a single dropped specimen, was recovered in proximity to other 
Confederate bullets and provided confirmation of a Confederate position to the north 
of Lee’s Ravine (Area 2).
The .69 caliber roundballs (n=2) may indicate the use of smoothbore muskets 
by the Confederates. While no Confederate participants were officially issued 
smoothbore muskets due to the unfeasibility of the longarm for mounted use, 
Confederate troopers may have used the smoothbores during the dismounted attack 
on the fort. The roundballs may have also been deposited by Union artillery fire.
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This idea is further corroborated as one roundball (MD 32) was recovered near the 
Parrott shell fragment within Area 1.
The recovery of a nose-end fragment of a 10-pounder Parrott shell confirms 
the presence of the two 10-pounder Parrott rifles manned by Battery M of the 3rd New 
York Light Artillery. The Union artillerymen appear to have fired upon a 
Confederate position located within Area 1. Small, unidentified shrapnel fragments 
(n=3) are associated with either the Union guns of the 3rd New York or the Dawn, 
given their location around the perimeter of the fortification.
Movements and Actions at the Battle o f  Wilson’s Wharf
The following synthesis combines the archaeological evidence with the 
historical documentation to form an interpretation of the actions at the Battle of 
Wilson’s Wharf. To interpret the movements, it was necessary to separate the battle 
into a series of discrete events. These divisions are identified for discussion purposes 
only, as actions on the battlefield were continuous and evolving. Only in hindsight 
does the conflict have definable elements.
Initial Confederate Attack
Confederate Major General Fitzhugh Lee arrived at Wilson’s Wharf around 
noon on May 24, 1864 and promptly ordered a mounted cavalry charge on the Union 
pickets posted some distance from the garrison. Companies C and F of the 1st 
U.S.C.T. initially checked the troopers, however, some of the Union pickets were cut 
off and captured. Lee then ordered his cavalrymen to dismount and attack the 
fortification on foot. Lee’s men formed a line of battle and marched through the field 
located to the north of Area 2. Private Henry St. George Tucker Brooke, Co. B, 2nd
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Virginia Cavalry described the initial attack on the fort. Brooke notes the 
Confederates began at “the river” and charged across a field where they came to a 
deep ravine 50 yards in width. Brooke’s description of “the field” corresponds with 
the area between the swampy arm of Kennons Creek to the north and Lee’s Ravine to 
the south.
Area 2 is situated within the southern end of “the field” and contains a 
concentration of fired Union bullets and dropped Confederate bullets. The evidence 
may represent the “destructive fire” encountered by the cavalrymen as they reached 
the ravine. However the pattern may also be attributed to the retreating Federal 
pickets firing at the Confederate skirmishers. The concentration confirms the 
southward movement of the Confederate troops across the field and toward Lee’s 
Ravine.
The large quantity and intermixing of Confederate and Union bullets within 
Lee’s Ravine confirms the movement of both armies through the drainage feature. 
The Confederates drove the Union pickets through the ravine and into the 
fortification. A group of Federal troops appear to have utilized a drainage cut to exit 
the ravine. A heavy concentration of dropped Union bullets was recovered at the top 
o f the cut indicating the pickets regrouped to make a stand against the advancing 
Confederates. A matching concentration of fired Union bullets at the bottom of the 
drainage cut identifies the position of pursuing Confederates.
Dunovant ’s Attack on the Union Left
After the Confederates halted at “the deep ravine” (Lee’s Ravine), Lee 
directed Dunovant to make a demonstration against the upper (north) and opposite
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(west) side of the fortification. The purpose was to draw the Union attention away 
from Wickham’s main attack on the Union right. For the feint on the Union left, 
Dunovant appears to have followed a small rise to the river in order to raise havoc on 
passing transports and the Union signal station. Union Lt. Simonton noted the 
unfinished condition of the line on the Union left and commented how “the enemy 
could easily and successfully have charged upon the works.” A small ravine to the 
west of the fort may have prevented the Confederates from easily overrunning the 
Union garrison.
A small concentration of ammunition was recovered at the top of the rise 
within Area 4. The dropped Confederate bullets and the fired Union bullets confirm 
the presence of the Confederate position to the west of the fortification.
Dunovant’s Attack on the Union Center
While a section of Dunovant’s troops moved against the Union left, the 
remainder of his command assaulted the Union center. The feint against the north 
side of the garrison appears to have followed along the west side of the old access 
road for the wharf. The road, which appears on an 1863 Confederate map (Gilmer 
1863), divides the fortification in half and is still in use today.
A mixed concentration of dropped and fired bullets associated with both 
participants appears to indicate a running fight occurred as the Confederates drove the 
Union pickets into the fort. A line of ten dropped Union bullets hints that a Federal 
soldier lost an entire bundle of cartridges in his haste for the safety of the earthworks. 
The recovery a 10-pounder Parrott shell fragment and a .69 caliber roundball suggests
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Battery M of the 3rd New York Light Artillery may have halted the Confederate 
advance with well-placed artillery fire.
Wickham's Main Charge on the Union Right
While Dunovant conducted his operations against the Union left and center, 
Lee ordered Wickham to attack the Union right. The east side of the fortification was 
the most complete, and therefore the strongest, at the time of the engagement. 
Wickham had the cavalrymen move through Lee’s Ravine in order to conceal their 
movements against the garrison. The troopers followed the feature until they 
encountered the swamp located at the southern turn of the ravine. As the marshy 
ground hindered the movement of the soldiers, the Confederate attack could not 
encompass the entire east side of the garrison. The main Confederate charge moved 
up and out of Lee’s Ravine and then across Area 5 (Large Circular Rise) against the 
east bastion of the fortification.
The low number of recovered artifacts suggests the Confederates did not focus 
the main attack against the eastern side of the garrison. Rather, it appears Wickham’s 
charge may have been concentrated against the east bastion, located in the northeast 
comer of the fortification.
Conclusion
The 2000 Wilson’s Wharf ABPP Survey resulted in identification and 
documentation of the May 24, 1864 engagement. A systematic metal detector survey, 
in conjunction with in-depth historical research, provided an efficient and effective 
means of evaluating the battle site. Metal detectors, if operated in a controlled 
manner by experienced professional archaeologists, can be a cost-effective approach.
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The technology allows the researcher to examine the large areas encompassed by 
most battlefields without expending the countless hours testing and excavating. The 
survey was able to sample approximately 658, 500 sq. ft. of the battlefield area over a 
four-day period.
The investigation recovered 205 artifacts relating to the Battle of Wilson’s 
Wharf. An analysis of the distribution of the artifacts throughout the battlefield 
landscape provided new insight into the order of the engagement. The archaeological 
evidence not only demonstrated a positive correlation with the historical record, but 
also provided new information regarding areas in which the written accounts were 
incomplete or silent. The strength of this type of investigation lies in its ability to 
draw together the documentary and archaeological record to form a richer account of 
the past.
The archaeological evidence supported the notion that the battle encompassed 
the north, east, and west sides of the fortification. The investigation identified Lee’s 
Ravine (Area 3) as an area of intense fighting, given the relatively large quantity of 
recovered artifacts. The ravine proved to be the circuitous and wooded route used by 
the Confederates to conceal their movements. Other Confederate positions were 
located throughout the study areas.
Perhaps the most significant departure between the historical and 
archaeological records was the location of Wickham’s main attack on the 
fortification. Historic accounts placed the charge on the Union right, however few 
battle-remains were recovered to the east o f the fortification. The archaeological 
evidence suggests the Confederates moved eastward through Lee’s Ravine but were
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forced to stop when they reached the swamp located in the southern end of the ravine. 
Wickham’s troopers may have charged only the east bastion rather than the entire 
eastern side of the fortification.
This thesis presents the Wilson’s Wharf battlefield as a cultural landscape of 
conflict in order to examine the full context of the May 24, 1864 battle event. The 
examination of the artifactual residue of the battle patterned within the cultural 
landscape, combined with an analysis of the historical documentation, reveals a 
multifaceted view of the behavioral processes that guided the actions of those men 
who fought and died at Wilson’s Wharf. The historical archaeological examination 
of any battlefield landscape must apply both the humanistic concern for meaning and 
intention with the scientific concern for form, behavior, and conditions. The 
Wilson’s Wharf study relied on a multievidential approach that maintained a balance 
between the historical and archaeological record in order to determine how the 
context of the battlefield landscape was negotiated and modified during the 
engagement.
The concern with the context of a specific battle can be viewed as 
particularistic however each engagement is unique with its own set of parameters. 
Whereas a domestic site may be occupied for decades, the average engagement lasts 
only a few hours to a few days and thus a battle event is hypersensitive to particular 
variables such as terrain, weather, tactics, armament, and individuals involved. These 
variables make up the historical and archaeological “facts” of a battle event and form 
the foundation of any battlefield interpretation.
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However, for battlefield studies to be relevant to the field of historical 
archaeology, researchers must go beyond the traditional concern with historical and 
archaeological facts in order to establish behavioral patterns that speak to the larger 
behavioral processes at work during combat. Through a comparison of the spatial 
and contextual relationships between battle-related artifacts, the Wilson’s Wharf 
study examines the patterns visible within the cultural landscape in order to interpret 
the battle events of May 24, 1864.
The Wilson’s Wharf battlefield landscape is viewed not as a physical but as a 
social construct that is modified and negotiated according to a set of cultural plans. 
When the Union army arrived at Wilson’s Wharf they set about manipulating the 
cultural landscape in order to create a defensible position for the garrison. The 
Federal soldiers set about clearing trees, digging ditches, building earthworks, and 
constructing shelters according to a prescribed set of military plans. When the 
Confederate cavalry attacked the Union garrison, the troopers also followed 
prescribed tactics by dismounting to assault the fortified position. The dismounted 
cavalrymen were forced to not only negotiate the man-made defense works of the 
Federal army but also the fields, swamps, ravines, woods, and waterways that make 
up the cultural landscape of Wilson’s Wharf. For example, Confederate troopers 
were unable to encompass the Federal right flank due to the presence of a large 
swamp. Also, the Federal control of the James River allowed the Union gunboat 
Dawn to provide a timely barrage that helped drive off the main Confederate attack. 
Ultimately the successful manipulation of the cultural landscape aided in the Union 
victory.
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This study of the Wilson’s Wharf battlefield landscape is meant not as an all- 
encompassing interpretation of the battle but rather as a foundation for future 
research. While the project only sampled the battlefield area, it provides an initial 
step in the examination of the behavioral processes that shaped the Battle of Wilson’s 
Wharf. Future research is recommended within areas not examined during the 
present study in order to develop a more detailed view of the spatial and contextual 
patterning of battle-related artifacts.
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APPENDIX
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL STUDY
Recommendations for additional archaeological study of the battlefield are 
presented below in current order of priority. The order is based on judgments of 
research potential for specific areas, gauged by degree of archaeological preservation, 
quality of archaeological evidence, and completeness of current knowledge; in short, 
those areas that offer the greatest potential to contribute relevant information about 
the least known aspects of the May 24, 1864 engagement.
Perimeter Areas
The boundaries of the battlefield should be identified in order to develop a 
preservation plan for the site. The ultimate goal of site improvements at Fort 
Pocahontas is to prepare for public interpretation during regular, guided tours and 
special events such as re-enactments. Much of the impact to the site comes from the 
development of roads and other facilities to accommodate visitors to the fort. Until 
the size of the engagement area is delineated, the archaeological remains of the battle 
will remain at risk. Once the limits of the site are known, a plan can be implemented 
to protect the archaeological record from modem disturbances.
The examination of the perimeter areas can also provide much needed insight 
into the areal extent and opening and closing actions of the battle. More information 
is needed regarding the location of the initial skirmish between Lee’s mounted 
troopers and Companies C and F of the 1st U.S.C.T and the final path of Lee’s retreat. 
Area 1
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Further archaeological testing should expand Area 1 to the north and west in 
order to provide a fuller account of the battle within the vicinity. Expansion of the 
area would answer questions regarding the Confederate attack on the north side of the 
fortification.
Area 2 - “The Field”
The large tract of land located between Area 2 and the arm of Kennons Creek 
to the north warrants further investigation to determine if it contains the initial 
Confederate line of battle. Private Henry St. George Tucker Brooke, Co. B., 2nd 
Virginia Cavalry portrayed a similar area in his account of the battle. He noted that 
the regiment marched to Kennons Creek and drew into a line of battle. The 
Confederates then charged across a field where they suddenly came to a deep ravine 
50 yards across. Brooke’s regiment may have formed into a battle line and marched 
across the field situated to the north of Area 2 only to be forced to halt when they 
reached Lee’s Ravine (Area 3). An expanded survey of the area would recover 
evidence of “the destructive fire” poured into the Confederates as they charged 
across. The destructive fire noted by Brooke may refer to the 100-pounder ordinance 
projected by the Union gunboat Dawn as another member of the 2nd Virginia Cavalry 
recalled the terrifying sight of the shells flying over.
Area 4 -  Powerline Cut
Area 4 should be expanded near the small Civil War artifact concentration in 
order to recover more evidence of Dunovant’s attack on the Union left. Further 
investigation can determine the extent o f the Confederate presence in this area and the 
location from which the 5th South Carolina Cavalry “sharpshooters” raised havoc on
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passing transports. Archaeological testing may reveal evidence of the Union signal 
station situated to the west of the fort.
Area 5 — Large Circular Rise
The Large Circular Rise should be examined for evidence of Wickham’s 
charge out of the ravine. The small sample area investigated in 2000 displayed 
evidence of heavy fighting. Further testing may confirm the rise was the scene of the 
repulse of the main Confederate attack against the fortification. The distribution of 
ammunition types within the area would answer a major question regarding the battle: 
was the artillery fire from the Union gunboat Dawn responsible for the turning back 
Wickham’s charge as indicated in the historic record? If this is the case then Area 5 
should be littered with projectile fragments like those fired from the gunboat.
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